Information and the Market for Union Representation
Matthew T. Bodie
Saint Louis University School of Law
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 94, 2008
Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-18
In its oversight of union representation elections, the National Labor Relations Board seeks to create laboratory conditions to determine "the uninhibited desires" of employees. Despite its comprehensive regulation of union and employer campaign conduct, however, the Board fails to insure that employees get basic information relating to their decision. This Article proposes a new paradigm for the representation decision: that of a purchase of representation services. This "purchase of services" model demonstrates that the market for union representation lacks the standard features required under economic theory to drive information into the marketplace. The resulting information deficiencies may render employees poorly equipped to make their representation decision.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 63
Keywords: union, union representation, representation election, labor marketAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 17, 2007
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.438 seconds