Judging International Judgments
Mark L. Movsesian
St. John's University School of Law
Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 48, 2007
Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-20
St. John's Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-0084
This article explores the Supreme Court's decision last term in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. In Sanchez-Llamas, the Court considered the effect that rulings of international tribunals - what I call "international judgments" - should have in American courts. The main opinions in the case mirror a scholarly debate that has raged for the last decade. The Court's opinion adopts a dualist position, under which international judgments have only information value. The dissent, by contrast, adopts the comity model that has gained considerable academic support in recent years. Under that model, American courts defer to international judgments, where possible, in the interests of global uniformity. I argue that the Court's position is the better one. The dualist approach allows domestic courts to balance the competing demands of international order and local autonomy. The comity model, by contrast, draws support from inapposite regional analogies and fails to solve the legitimacy problems that international courts present. In rejecting the comity model, the Sanchez-Llamas Court casts doubt on the long-term prospects of comity scholarship and assures that the American approach to international judgments will be a sensible one.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 55
Keywords: Courts, ICJ, International Judgments, International Tribunals, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, Supreme Court
JEL Classification: K33Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 20, 2007 ; Last revised: December 10, 2007
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.329 seconds