Legitimacy, Selectivity, and the Disunitary Executive: A Reply to Sally Katzen

Abstract:     
Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh respond to the comments of Sally Katzen on their article presenting and analyzing results from an empirical study of the top political appointees at the Enviromental Protection Agency (EPA) during the William Clinton and George H.W. Bush administrations. In their previous article, Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh examined White House involvement in EPA rulemaking during the relevant periods, concluding that it may be a more complex and less positive phenomenon than previous studies have acknowledged. In this reply, the authors reinforce why the EPA is an important agency to study for information about White House involvement in agency rulemaking, and why it matters that multiple offices and individuals within the White House are involved in agency rulemaking.

Keywords: agency, administrative, environment, president, OMB, OIRA, accountability, regulation, regulatory, rulemaking, empirical, executive, efficiency, efficacy, cost-benefit analysis

Accepted Paper Series