The Missing Theory of Variable Selection in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law

James M. Anderson

RAND Corporation

April 1, 2006

2007 Utah L. Rev. 255 (2007)

The Article argues that the economic analysis of tort law has yet to satisfactorily answer a critical threshold question: which of the many inputs that lead to an accident should be included in a court's liability analysis? As a result of this missing theory, the economic analysis of tort law provides indeterminate prescriptions. The Article shows how three separate areas of the literature can be seen as being about the general problem of which variables to include in the liability test and the tension between short- and long-run optima. The Article proposes an analytical framework - a continuum from short- to long-run - to understand the problem and show the way in which courts have crafted tort law doctrines to address the issue. Finally, the Article concludes that no satisfactory general theory is possible and that the optimal combination of liability rules will depend upon empirical questions about specific accident contexts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: tort, law and economics

JEL Classification: K13

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: May 23, 2007 ; Last revised: February 17, 2013

Suggested Citation

Anderson, James M., The Missing Theory of Variable Selection in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law (April 1, 2006). 2007 Utah L. Rev. 255 (2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=987957 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.987957

Contact Information

James M. Anderson (Contact Author)
RAND Corporation ( email )
4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665
United States
412 683-2300 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 380
Downloads: 5

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.313 seconds