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Comment on Crandall and Winston (2003)

John M. Connor
Purdue University; American Antitrust Institute (AAI)


january 2004


Abstract:     
In a paper published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives in the fall of 2003, Robert Crandall and Clifford Winston all but call for the repeal of the Nation's antitrust laws. Their qualifications to make such a radical proposal are in doubt, but more importantly their purported review of empirical studies of overt price-fixing effects is shallow, biased, and naïve. Crandall and Winston's assertion that the direct benefits of convicting price-fixers are slight is central to their paper's thesis. Their review is shallow because the five studies that they examine comprise less than 2% of the economic literature that quantitatively estimates the price effects of explicit price-fixing schemes; it is biased because the chosen studies find no or weak price effects, whereas the vast majority of such studies find significant positive effects on price during the collusive period; it is naïve because the selected studies are either severely flawed or irrelevant.

Keywords: antitrust laws, effectiveness, crandall, winston

JEL Classifications: K21, K14, L41, L44, L65, L11, L13, N60

Working Paper Series

Date posted: May 31, 2007 ; Last revised: September 05, 2007

Suggested Citation

Connor, John M., Comment on Crandall and Winston (2003) (january 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=988740


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Contact Information

John M. Connor (Contact Author)
Purdue University ( email )
403 W. State St.
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056
United States
7654944260 (Phone)
7654949176 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.purdue.edu/staff/facindex.asp
American Antitrust Institute (AAI)
2919 Ellicott Street, N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20008-1022
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.antitrustinstitute.com
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