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Risky Choice and the Relative Size of Stakes

Guido Baltussen
New York University - Stern School of Business; New York University - Department of Finance

Thierry Post
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE); Tinbergen Institute; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) - Joint Research Institute of Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) and Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), EUR; City University London - Sir John Cass Business School; University of Wales System - Prifysgol Bangor University

Martijn J. Van den Assem
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)


May 2008


Abstract:     
We examine framing effects by analyzing how risky choice depends on the absolute and relative size of the amounts at stake, using an extensive sample of choices from ten different editions of the large-stake TV game show Deal or No Deal. Our analyses within and across the samples suggest that risky choice is highly sensitive to the context, as defined by the initial set of prizes in the game. In each sample, contestants respond in a similar way to the stakes relative to their initial level, even though the initial level differs widely across the various editions. Amounts therefore appear to be primarily evaluated relative to a subjective frame of reference rather than in terms of their absolute monetary value.

Keywords: Decision making under risk, Framing, Expected utility theory, Prospect theory

JEL Classifications: D81, C93

Working Paper Series

Date posted: May 29, 2007 ; Last revised: May 06, 2008

Suggested Citation

Baltussen, Guido, Post, Thierry and Van den Assem, Martijn J., Risky Choice and the Relative Size of Stakes (May 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=989242


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Contact Information

Martijn J. Van den Assem (Contact Author)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam NL 3062 PA
Netherlands
Guido Baltussen
New York University - Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
New York University - Department of Finance ( email )
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
Thierry Post
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam NL 3062 PA
Netherlands
+31 0 10 408 1428 (Phone)
+31 0 10 408 9165 (Fax)
Tinbergen Institute
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam Netherlands
Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) - Joint Research Institute of Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) and Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), EUR
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam Netherlands
City University London - Sir John Cass Business School ( email )
106 Bunhill Row
London EC1Y 8TZ United Kingdom
University of Wales System - Prifysgol Bangor University ( email )
Bangor, Gwynedd LL57 2DG, Wales United Kingdom
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References: 15
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