Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=989557
 
 

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Opportunistic Termination


Alexander Stremitzer


UCLA School of Law

April 4, 2010

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2012, 28(3): 381-406.
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 407

Abstract:     
If a seller delivers a good non-conforming to contract, European and US warranty law allows consumers to choose between some money transfer and termination. Termination rights are, however, widely criticized, mainly for fear that the buyer may use non-conformity as a pretext for getting rid of a contract he no longer wants. We show that this possibility of "opportunistic termination" might actually have positive effects. Under some circumstances, it will lead to redistribution in favour of the buyer without any loss of efficiency. Moreover, by curbing the monopoly power of the seller, a regime involving termination might increase welfare by enabling a more efficient output level in a setting with multiple buyers. These potential benefits are absent if renegotiation is possible.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: contract law, warranties, breach remedies, termination, harmonization, comparative law.

JEL Classification: K12, C7, L40, D30

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Date posted: May 29, 2007 ; Last revised: April 1, 2013

Suggested Citation

Stremitzer, Alexander, Opportunistic Termination (April 4, 2010). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2012, 28(3): 381-406. ; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 407. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=989557 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.989557

Contact Information

Alexander Stremitzer (Contact Author)
UCLA School of Law ( email )
405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 90095-1476
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/all-faculty-profiles/professors/Pages/Alexander-Stremitzer.aspx
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