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The EC Commission's 2006 Fine Guidelines Reviewed from an Economic Perspective: Risking Over-Deterrence


Patrick J. G. Van Cayseele


KU Leuven - Department of Economics

P.D.N. Camesasca


affiliation not provided to SSRN

May 2007

Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2007-03

Abstract:     
We test the economic principles that play a role for imposing fines against the intentions put forward by the EC Commission in the new 2006 Fine Guidelines.

Whereas a number of economists in the past adopted the opinion that cartel enforcement policy was too lax in Europe, it is now much stricter.

The 2006 Fine Guidelines only bear a slight link to the economic determinants of the advantages that an infringement produces. As a result, they introduce distortions, in the sense that some offenders are dealt with more severely than others. It is therefore not possible to translate stricter enforcement into more effective enforcement. While serious offenders may still escape with a relatively favorable fine, there is now a risk that 'overkill' will be created in other cases.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: fine guidelines, antitrust, enforcement

JEL Classification: D43, K42, L41

working papers series





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Date posted: May 30, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Van Cayseele, Patrick J. G. and Camesasca, P.D.N., The EC Commission's 2006 Fine Guidelines Reviewed from an Economic Perspective: Risking Over-Deterrence (May 2007). Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2007-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=989628 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.989628

Contact Information

Patrick G. J. Van Cayseele (Contact Author)
KU Leuven - Department of Economics ( email )
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
+32-16-326830 (Phone)
+32-16-326796 (Fax)
P.D.N. Camesasca
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
No Address Available
Feedback to SSRN


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