Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=990057
 
 

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Bebchuk's Case for Increasing Shareholder Power: An Opposition


Theodore N. Mirvis


Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

Paul K. Rowe


Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

William Savitt


Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

May 2007

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 586

Abstract:     
This paper sets out the view that Lucian Bebchuk's "case for increasing shareholder power" is exceedingly weak. It demonstrates that Bebchuk's proposed overthrow of core Delaware corporate law principles risks extraordinarily costly disruption without any assurance of corresponding benefit; that Bechuk's case is unsupported by any persuasive empirical data; that Bebchuk's premise that corporate boards cannot be trusted to respect their fiduciary duty finds no resonance in the observed experience of boardroom practitioners (perhaps not surprisingly, as the proposal comes from the height of the ivory tower); and that its obsession with shareholder power is particularly suspect (if not downright dangerous) in light of the palpable practical problems of any shareholder-centric approach.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Keywords: Corporate governance, shareholders, boards, directors

JEL Classification: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K2

working papers series


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Date posted: June 3, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Mirvis, Theodore N. and Rowe, Paul K. and Savitt, William, Bebchuk's Case for Increasing Shareholder Power: An Opposition (May 2007). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 586. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=990057 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.990057

Contact Information

Theodore N. Mirvis (Contact Author)
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz ( email )
51 West 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019
United States
Paul K. Rowe
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz ( email )
51 West 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019
United States
212-403-1000 (Phone)
William Savitt
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz ( email )
51 West 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019
United States
212-403-1329 (Phone)
212-403-2329 (Fax)
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