Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=990942
 
 

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Which Way to Cooperate


Todd R. Kaplan


University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics; University of Haifa - Department of Economics

Bradley J. Ruffle


Wilfrid Laurier University - School of Business & Economics

October 2011


Abstract:     
We introduce a two-player, binary-choice game in which both players have a privately known incentive to enter, yet the combined surplus is highest if only one enters. Repetition of this game admits two distinct ways to cooperate: turn taking and cutoffs, which rely on the player's private value to entry. A series of experiments highlights the role of private information in determining which mode players adopt. If an individual's entry values vary little (e.g., mundane tasks), taking turns is likely; if these potential values are diverse (e.g., difficult tasks that differentiate individuals by skill or preferences), cutoff cooperation emerges.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: experimental economics, cooperation, incomplete information, alternating, cutoff strategies, random payoffs

JEL Classification: C90, Z13

working papers series





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Date posted: June 4, 2007 ; Last revised: October 3, 2011

Suggested Citation

Kaplan, Todd R. and Ruffle, Bradley J., Which Way to Cooperate (October 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=990942 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.990942

Contact Information

Todd R. Kaplan
University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics ( email )
Streatham Court
Exeter, EX4 4RJ
United Kingdom
+44 13 9226 3237 (Phone)
University of Haifa - Department of Economics
Haifa 31905
Israel
Bradley J. Ruffle (Contact Author)
Wilfrid Laurier University - School of Business & Economics ( email )
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5
Canada
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