Prolegomena to a Process Theory of Natural Law
Mark C. Modak-Truran
Mississippi College - School of Law
1 HANDBOOK OF WHITEHEADIAN PROCESS THOUGHT pp. 507-19 & pp. 533-36, Michel Weber, Will Desmond, eds., Ontos Verlag, 2008
Mississippi College School of Law Research Paper No. 2008-02
Two contemporary quandaries in legal theory provide an occasion for a revival of interest in natural law theories of law. First, the debate about legal indeterminacy has made it clear that law cannot function autonomously (as a self-contained set of rules) but requires a normative justification of judges' decisions in hard cases. In addition, Steven D. Smith has persuasively argued that there is an "ontological gap" between the practice of law, which presupposes a classical or religious ontology, and legal theory, which presupposes a scientific ontology (i.e., scientific materialism) that rejects religious ontology. This article demonstrates how the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and the radical empiricism of William James support a new process theory of natural law. Under this theory, judges resolve legal indeterminacy by determining what maximizes the telos beauty (in accordance with the circumstances of the case and the social perfection possible within that society) rather than by relying on fixed, antiquated natural laws. Process natural law also closes the ontological gap by providing an ontology that unifies the moral insights of religion with the insights of modern science.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 18
Keywords: Legal Theory, Natural Law, Jurisprudence, Alfred North Whitehead, William James, Legal Indeterminancy, Process Philosophy
JEL Classification: K1, K3, K4, K10, K19, K30, K39, K40, K49Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: June 7, 2007 ; Last revised: May 7, 2008
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.281 seconds