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First, Assume a Monopoly: The Failure of Vertical Foreclosure Theory on the Never-was-Neutral Internet

Douglas A. Hass
Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; The Skye Group



Journal of Systemics, Cybernetics, and Informatics, Vol. 6, No. 5, p. 42, 2008
Proceedings of the International Conference on Social & Organizational Informatics & Cybernetics (SOIC), Vol. 3, p. 300, 2007

Abstract:     
Internet service providers and their customers have understood and debated the concepts of net neutrality since the beginning of the era of dial-up bulletin board systems. Commentators have only recently joined the debate, and often overlook history. No commentator, legislator, or regulator can be certain how networks and technologies will evolve over the next decade - especially when they misunderstand how those networks evolved over the last one.

This paper refocuses the net neutrality debate by challenging the application of vertical foreclosure theory to today's non-neutral Internet access and content markets. The paper finds that the current policy fascination with non-existant net neutrality is ill founded. Disclosure and a broader focus on both network and content providers' non-neutral traffic policies would better enable the market to choose technologies and business models dynamically while still providing regulators with a potential enforcement mechanism.

Keywords: net neutrality, FCC, broadband, Internet, monopoly, economics, vertical foreclosure

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: June 07, 2007 ; Last revised: February 01, 2009

Suggested Citation

Hass, Douglas A., First, Assume a Monopoly: The Failure of Vertical Foreclosure Theory on the Never-was-Neutral Internet. Proceedings of the International Conference on Social & Organizational Informatics & Cybernetics (SOIC), Vol. 3, p. 300, 2007; Proceedings of the International Conference on Social & Organizational Informatics & Cybernetics (SOIC), Vol. 3, p. 300, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=991656


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Contact Information

Douglas A. Hass (Contact Author)
Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington ( email )
211 S. Indiana Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
The Skye Group ( email )
1841 E Waters Edge Drive #96
Bloomington, IN 47401
United States
773-634-9510 (Phone)
773-634-8411 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.skyegroup.com
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