Firm-Level Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A Case Study of India
Bala N. Balasubramanian
Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad; IIM Bangalore - Centre for Corporate Governance and Citizensip; Adjunct Professor
Bernard S. Black
Northwestern University - School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Vikramaditya S. Khanna
University of Michigan Law School
July 2, 2008
ECGI - Law Working Paper 119/2009
2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
U of Michigan Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper 08-011
U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 87
Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-14
We provide an overview of Indian corporate governance practices, based primarily on responses to a 2006 survey of 370 Indian public companies. Compliance with legal norms is reasonably high in most areas, but not complete. We identify areas where Indian corporate governance is relatively strong and weak, and areas where regulation might usefully be either relaxed or strengthened. On the whole, Indian corporate governance rules appear appropriate for larger companies, but could use some strengthening in the area of related party transactions, and some relaxation for smaller companies. Executive compensation is low by U.S. standards and is not currently a problem area.
We also examine whether there is a cross-sectional relationship between measures of governance and measures of firm performance and find evidence of a positive relationship for an overall governance index and for an index covering shareholder rights. We find an overall association, which is stronger for more profitable firms and firms with stronger growth opportunities. A subindex for shareholder rights is individually significant, but subindices for board structure (board independence and committee structure), disclosure, board procedure, and related party transactions are not significant. The non-results for board structure contrast to other recent studies, and suggest that India's legal requirements are sufficiently strict so that overcompliance does not produce valuation gains.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
Keywords: India, securities law, corporate governance, Clause 49
JEL Classification: G15, G34, G38, K22
Date posted: March 9, 2008 ; Last revised: July 6, 2009
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