Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=992660
 


 



Dutch First Price Auctions for Public Service Provision


Laura Levaggi


Free University of Bozen - Faculty of Science and Technology

Rosella Levaggi


University of Brescia - Department of Economics and Management

June 8, 2009


Abstract:     
Public service provision has undergone a significant process of reform which aim at increasing efficiency of the system and improving welfare. In most cases the regulator has to determine the reimbursement for the provider without observing costs. Another important characteristic of public service provision is related to workers' motivation, acting as private information rent to the provider. In this paper we analyse Dutch first price auction mechanisms to introduce competition in the market as a way to regulate the market in order to extract the information rent from the provider. In particular, single service and multiple object auctions are compared.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

Keywords: Auction, N goods, private information

JEL Classification: C72, D44

working papers series





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Date posted: June 11, 2007 ; Last revised: December 12, 2012

Suggested Citation

Levaggi, Laura and Levaggi, Rosella, Dutch First Price Auctions for Public Service Provision (June 8, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=992660 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.992660

Contact Information

Laura Levaggi (Contact Author)
Free University of Bozen - Faculty of Science and Technology ( email )
Universitätsplatzt, 1
Bozen, 39100
Italy
Rosella Levaggi
University of Brescia - Department of Economics and Management ( email )
Via San Faustino 74B
Brescia, 25122
Italy
+39 03 0298 8825 (Phone)
+39 03 0298 8837 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.eco.unibs.it/segdse/rlev/index.htm
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