Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus
University of St. Gallen
Thomas Von Ungern-Sternberg
University of Lausanne - Department of Economics (DEEP); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1995
We examine the effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus, influencing firms' whistle blowing incentives in one market, on their self-reporting decision in another market. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus are proactive US strategies which aim at triggering multiple confessions by increasing the incentives of already convicted firms to report in another market where they collude. Predictably, conditional on conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus strengthen firms' incentives to report the remaining cartel. However, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous impact on firms' incentives to apply for amnesty in the first place: On the one hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may help to sustain a cartel, otherwise reported under the EC policy. On the other hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may induce immediate reporting of both cartels whereas only one of them would have been reported under the EC Leniency Program.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28
Keywords: Amnesty Plus, self-reporting, antitrust, multimarket contact
JEL Classification: K21, K42, L41working papers series
Date posted: June 11, 2007
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