Migrating Football Players, Transfer Fees and Migration Controls
Harrie A. A. Verbon
Tilburg University - CentER; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2004
Since the famous Bosman ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1995 transfer fees for football players after moving to another club have become suspect as they are considered as an obstacle to the free movement of workers. However, in an unrestricted market free migration from football players will be Pareto efficient under special circumstances only. This paper shows that transfer fees can correct inefficient migration flows from small to large football leagues. Home-grown rules that prescribe that a certain proportion of the roster of players should be trained within the club are very blunt devices for restoring efficiency, and perform worse than transfer fee systems.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 33
Keywords: football transfers, migration equilibrium, social welfare
JEL Classification: H77, J61, L83working papers series
Date posted: June 14, 2007
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