Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=994234
 
 

References (56)



 
 

Citations (9)



 


 



Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic Violence? Evidence from Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws


Radha Iyengar


Harvard University - Center for Government and International Studies; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

June 2007

NBER Working Paper No. w13186

Abstract:     
Domestic violence remains a major public policy concern despite two decades of policy intervention. To eliminate police inaction in response to domestic violence, many states have passed mandatory arrest laws, which require the police to arrest abusers when a domestic violence incident is reported. These laws were justified by a randomized experiment in Minnesota which found that arrests reduced future violence. This experiment was conducted during a time period when arrest was optional. Using the FBI Supplementary Homicide Reports, I find mandatory arrest laws actually increased intimate partner homicides. I hypothesize that this increase in homicides is due to decreased reporting. I investigate validity of this reporting hypothesis by examining the effect of mandatory arrest laws on family homicides where the victim is less often responsible for reporting. For family homicides, mandatory arrest laws appear to reduce the number of homicides. This study therefore provides evidence that these laws may have perverse effects on intimate partner violence, harming the very people they seek to help.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: June 27, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Iyengar, Radha, Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic Violence? Evidence from Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws (June 2007). NBER Working Paper No. w13186. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=994234

Contact Information

Radha Iyengar (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Center for Government and International Studies ( email )
1730 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,317
Downloads: 172
Download Rank: 102,892
References:  56
Citations:  9

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.313 seconds