|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory: The Harsanyi - Schelling Debate on the Axiom of SymmetryAlessandro InnocentiUniversity of Siena - Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory; University of Siena - Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences History of Political Economy, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 111-132, 2008 Abstract: This paper analyses the early contributions of John Harsanyi and Thomas C. Schelling to bargaining theory. In the 1950s Harsanyi draws Nash's solution to two-person cooperative games from the bargaining model proposed by Zeuthen (1930) and Schelling proposes a multi-faceted theory of conflict that, without dismissing the assumption of rational behavior, points out some of its paradoxical consequences. Harsanyi and Schelling's contrasting views on the axiom of symmetry, as postulated by Nash (1950), are then presented. This debate explains why, although in the early 1960s two different approaches to link strategic interaction and bargaining theory were proposed, only Harsanyi's insights were fully developed later.
Keywords: bargaining, game theory, symmetry JEL Classification: B21, B41, C78 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: March 19, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.266 seconds
