University College London - Department of Economics; Washington University in Saint Louis - John M. Olin Business School
Northwestern University - Department of Economics
George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
June 20, 2007
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1575R
PIER Working Paper No. 07-018
Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. The signals are independent and identically distributed across time but not necessarily across agents. We show that that when each agent's signal space is finite, the agents will commonly learn its value, i.e., that the true value of the parameter will become approximate common-knowledge. In contrast, if the agents' observations come from a countably infinite signal space, then this contraction mapping property fails. We show by example that common learning can fail in this case.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 38
Keywords: Common learning, Common belief, Private signals, Private beliefs
JEL Classification: D82, D83working papers series
Date posted: June 21, 2007
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