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Common Learning


Martin Cripps


University College London - Department of Economics; Washington University in Saint Louis - John M. Olin Business School

J.C. Ely


Northwestern University - Department of Economics

George J. Mailath


University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Larry Samuelson


Yale University

June 20, 2007

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1575R
PIER Working Paper No. 07-018

Abstract:     
Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. The signals are independent and identically distributed across time but not necessarily across agents. We show that that when each agent's signal space is finite, the agents will commonly learn its value, i.e., that the true value of the parameter will become approximate common-knowledge. In contrast, if the agents' observations come from a countably infinite signal space, then this contraction mapping property fails. We show by example that common learning can fail in this case.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: Common learning, Common belief, Private signals, Private beliefs

JEL Classification: D82, D83

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Date posted: June 21, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Cripps, Martin, Ely, J.C., Mailath, George J. and Samuelson, Larry, Common Learning (June 20, 2007). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1575R; PIER Working Paper No. 07-018. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=995818

Contact Information

Martin Cripps
University College London - Department of Economics ( email )
Gower Street
London
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom
Washington University in Saint Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )
One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States
314-935-4580 (Phone)
314-935-6359 (Fax)
Jeffrey C. Ely
Northwestern University - Department of Economics ( email )
2003 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-8219 (Phone)
George J. Mailath (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7749 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~gmailath
Larry Samuelson
Yale University ( email )
30 Hillhouse Avenue
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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