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Whom Does the Written Contract Protect?


Yang Xiao-wei


Beijing Normal University - School of Economics and Business Administration

Dai Zhiyong


Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE)

April 2007


Abstract:     
Written contracts result from inter-temporal transaction. Transaction means Pareto Improvement and consensus as well. But does it mean both of them or just one part has more incentive to get the promises down? This paper thinks that it is the potential victim of opportunism that insists the contract written down to ask for enforcement help from the third party when necessary. However, the possible opportunist is passive whether the contract should be written down. When the victim has the ability to enforce the contract on his own, he also wants a written contract to prove his innocence. But this motive contributes to excess supply of clauses of formatted contract.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: Opportunism, Hold-up, Potential victim, Advantageous enforcement part, Formatted contract

JEL Classification: D02, D99, K12

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Date posted: June 29, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Xiao-wei, Yang and Zhiyong, Dai, Whom Does the Written Contract Protect? (April 2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=996312 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.996312

Contact Information

Yang Xiao-wei
Beijing Normal University - School of Economics and Business Administration ( email )
19 Xin jie kou wai da jie
Beijing, 100875
China
Dai Zhiyong (Contact Author)
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) ( email )
Chengdu, Sichuan 610074
China
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