|
||||
|
||||
The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What is it? Why is it Bad?
Chris William Sanchirico University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Business & Public Policy Department U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 07-14 University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 75, 2008 U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 07-28 Abstract: Private equity is very much in the public eye. The prototypical private equity fund purchases, restructures, and resells ailing companies. The managers of such funds are typically paid with a share of the fund's profits. Over the last several months, the favorable income tax treatment of these compensatory profits interests has been the subject of an ever swelling stream of headlines, editorials, and Congressional hearings. But despite the attention the issue has received, the tax advantage of compensatory profit shares is not well understood, and the reasons for reform are, accordingly, not well developed. This article clarifies the nature of the tax advantage and, with that understanding in mind, critically assesses some of the chief arguments for and against the current tax treatment.
Keywords: Private equity, profits interests, carry, capital gains, ordinary income, inputed income, deferral JEL Classifications: H2, H25, D2, D3, D6 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: June 26, 2007 ; Last revised: September 14, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo3 in 0.109 seconds.