Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=997105
 
 

References (25)



 
 

Citations (7)



 


 



Shadow Wages, Allocative Inefficiency, and Labor Supply in Smallholder Agriculture


Christopher B. Barrett


Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics & Management

Shane M. Sherlund


Federal Reserve Board of Governors

Akinwumi A. Adesina


Rockefeller Foundation


Agricultural Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This paper introduces a method for estimating structural labor supply models in the presence of unobservable wages and deviations of households' marginal revenue product of self-employed labor from their shadow wage. This method is therefore robust to a wide range of assumptions about labor allocation decisions in the presence of uncertainty, market frictions, locational preferences, etc. We illustrate the method using data from rice producers in Côte d'Ivoire. These data, like previous studies, reveal significant, systematic differences between shadow wages and the marginal revenue product of family farm labor. We demonstrate how one can exploit systematic deviations, in the present case related to household characteristics such as the land/labor endowment ratio, to control for both unobservable wages and prospective allocative inefficiency in labor allocation in structural household labor supply estimation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

JEL Classification: O1, J0, C3, Q1

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: June 28, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Barrett, Christopher B. and Sherlund, Shane M. and Adesina, Akinwumi A., Shadow Wages, Allocative Inefficiency, and Labor Supply in Smallholder Agriculture. Agricultural Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=997105

Contact Information

Christopher B. Barrett (Contact Author)
Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics & Management ( email )
315 Warren Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-7801
United States
607-255-4489 (Phone)
607-255-9984 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://aem.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/cbb2/
Shane M. Sherlund
Federal Reserve Board of Governors ( email )
20th and C Streets, NW
Mailstop 93
Washington, DC 20551
United States
202-452-3589 (Phone)
202-728-5887 (Fax)
Akinwumi A. Adesina
Rockefeller Foundation ( email )
420 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10018-2702
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 714
Downloads: 98
Download Rank: 58,892
References:  25
Citations:  7

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.282 seconds