Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=997371
 
 

Citations (4)



 
 

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Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications


Johan Stennek


Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Thomas Tangerås


Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

February 2007

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6073

Abstract:     
This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome prevails independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A light-handed regulatory policy can induce effective competition. Call prices are close to the marginal cost if the networks are sufficiently close substitutes. Neither demand nor cost information is required. A unique and symmetric call price equilibrium exists under symmetric access prices, provided that call demand is sufficiently inelastic. Existence encompasses the case of many networks and high network substitutability.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Access price competition, entry, network competition, network substitutability, regulation, two-way access

JEL Classification: L51, L96

working papers series


Date posted: June 29, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Stennek, Johan and Tangerås, Thomas, Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications (February 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6073. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=997371

Contact Information

Johan Stennek (Contact Author)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )
P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 665 4536 (Phone)
+46 8 665 4599 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Thomas Tangerås
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )
Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden
HOME PAGE: http://www.ifn.se/thomast
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