Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=997391
 
 

References (9)



 
 

Citations (7)



 


 



Outsourcing Tariff Evasion: A New Explanation for Entrepôt Trade


Raymond J. Fisman


Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Peter Moustakerski


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Shang-Jin Wei


Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); International Monetary Fund (IMF); Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management

February 2007

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6078

Abstract:     
Traditional explanations for indirect trade through an entrepôt have focused on savings in transport costs and on the role of specialized agents in processing and distribution. We provide an alternative perspective based on the possibility that entrepôts may facilitate tariff evasion. Using data on direct exports to mainland China and indirect exports via Hong Kong SAR, we find that the indirect export rate rises with the Chinese tariff rate, even though there is no legal tax advantage to sending goods via Hong Kong SAR. We undertake a number of extensions to rule out plausible alternative hypotheses based on existing explanations for entrepôt trade.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: Corruption, middleman, tax evasion

JEL Classification: F1, H2

working papers series





Date posted: June 29, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Fisman, Raymond J. and Moustakerski, Peter and Wei, Shang-Jin, Outsourcing Tariff Evasion: A New Explanation for Entrepôt Trade (February 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6078. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=997391

Contact Information

Raymond Fisman
Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
(212) 854-5553 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Peter Moustakerski
affiliation not provided to SSRN
No Address Available
Shang-Jin Wei (Contact Author)
Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States
Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management
Beijing, 100084
China
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References:  9
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