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Outsourcing Tariff Evasion: A New Explanation for Entrepôt TradeRaymond J. FismanColumbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Peter Moustakerskiaffiliation not provided to SSRN Shang-Jin WeiColumbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); International Monetary Fund (IMF); Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management February 2007 CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6078 Abstract: Traditional explanations for indirect trade through an entrepôt have focused on savings in transport costs and on the role of specialized agents in processing and distribution. We provide an alternative perspective based on the possibility that entrepôts may facilitate tariff evasion. Using data on direct exports to mainland China and indirect exports via Hong Kong SAR, we find that the indirect export rate rises with the Chinese tariff rate, even though there is no legal tax advantage to sending goods via Hong Kong SAR. We undertake a number of extensions to rule out plausible alternative hypotheses based on existing explanations for entrepôt trade.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22 Keywords: Corruption, middleman, tax evasion JEL Classification: F1, H2 working papers seriesDate posted: June 29, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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