The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges' Voting

Abstract:     
This study provides empirical evidence supporting the widespread belief that judges respond to political pressure in an effort to be reelected or reappointed. Using a dataset of almost every decision in state supreme courts from 1995-1998, I find that state supreme court judges who face retention decisions by Republicans tend to decide cases in accord with standard Republican policy: they are more likely to vote for businesses over individuals, for employers in labor disputes, for doctors and hospitals in medical malpractice cases, for the original defendant in torts cases, and against criminals in criminal appeals. The mirror image applies for judges facing retention decisions by Democrats. The results are stronger for judges facing reelection, and especially for judges facing partisan reelections. Moreover, I find evidence that when a judge is of a different political party than the people responsible for her retention, the judge's votes appear to reflect the preferences of the retention agents rather than her own ideology. In addition, judges' voting changes when the political preferences of the retention agents change. In contrast, judges with permanent tenure do not respond to the same forms of political pressures.

Keywords: judges, judicial decisionmaking

JEL Classifications: K00, K4, K41

Working Paper Series