An Empirical Examination of Product and Litigant-Specific Theories for the Divergence between NAFTA Chapter 19 and U.S. Judicial Review
Juscelino F. Colares
Case Western Reserve University School of Law
September 17, 2008
Journal of World Trade, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 691-722, 2008
2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
Empirical analysis of NAFTA panel review has shown that panels reverse US agency trade remedy determinations twice as often as US courts. Recent studies have eliminated case selection and other hypotheses as potential explanations for this divergence. In this article, Probit regressions show that case docket differences, such as type of import or litigant identity, also cannot account for this discrepancy. As NAFTA panels must apply the same law and standards of review as the US courts they replace, this divergence presents serious questions regarding US Congressional acquiescence to the operation of NAFTA panels and encourages discussion of the role or absence of popular preferences in the trade policy process.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: empirical, international trade, NAFTA Chapter 19 panels, judicial review, divergence, asymmetric decisions, trade remedies, AD/CVD law, agency determinations, deference, public choice, capture, trade liberalization
JEL Classification: F13, F53, F55, K33
Date posted: July 5, 2007 ; Last revised: October 7, 2008
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