Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=998153
 
 

References (50)



 
 

Citations (18)



 


 



Is European M&A Regulation Protectionist?


Nihat Aktas


WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Eric De Bodt


Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School

Richard Roll


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area


Economic Journal, Vol. 117, No. 522, pp. 1096-1121, July 2007

Abstract:     
Why do regulatory authorities scrutinise mergers and acquisitions? The authorities themselves claim to be combating monopoly power and protecting consumers. But the last two decades of empirical research has found little supporting evidence for such motives. An alternative is that M&A regulation is actually designed to protect privileged firms. We provide a test of protectionism by studying whether European regulatory intervention is more likely when European firms are harmed by increased competition. Our findings raise a suspicion of protectionist motivations by the European regulator during the 1990s. The results are robust to many statistical difficulties, including endogeneity between investor valuations and regulatory actions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: July 8, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Aktas, Nihat and de Bodt, Eric and Roll, Richard, Is European M&A Regulation Protectionist?. Economic Journal, Vol. 117, No. 522, pp. 1096-1121, July 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=998153 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02068.x

Contact Information

Nihat Aktas (Contact Author)
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )
Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany
Eric De Bodt
Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School ( email )
1 place Déliot, BP381
59020 Lille Cedex
France
+03 20 90 74 77 (Phone)
+03 20 90 77 02 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.edebodt.net
Richard W. Roll
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-6118 (Phone)
310-206-8404 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  50
Citations:  18

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