Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=998160
 
 

References (17)



 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games


Mary L. Rigdon


Rutgers University; National Science Foundation

Kevin A. McCabe


George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University School of Law

Vernon L. Smith


Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; Chapman University School of Law


Economic Journal, Vol. 117, No. 522, pp. 991-1007, July 2007

Abstract:     
It is well known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are then paired according to those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy types. In the control comparisons, Players 1 are randomly repaired with Players 2 without regard to type. We ask: are there natural tendencies for people to cooperate more frequently in environments in which they experience more cooperation in comparison with controls?

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: July 8, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Rigdon, Mary L. and McCabe, Kevin A. and Smith, Vernon L., Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games. Economic Journal, Vol. 117, No. 522, pp. 991-1007, July 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=998160 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02075.x

Contact Information

Mary Rigdon (Contact Author)
Rutgers University ( email )
Department of Economics
75 Hamilton St.
New Brunswick, NJ US 08901-1248
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~mrigdon/
National Science Foundation ( email )
4201 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, VA 22230
United States
Kevin A. McCabe
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
Vernon L. Smith
Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )
One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States
714-628-2830 (Phone)
Chapman University School of Law ( email )
One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866-1099
United States
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References:  17
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