Abstract

 


 



Does it Pay for Acquirers to Be Friendly?


Sema Dube


Yeditepe University

John L. Glascock


University of Connecticut; European Business School

Rafael Romero


SUNY Institute of Technology

2008

Corporate Ownership and Control, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 327-342

Abstract:     
Friendly acquisitions have lower premiums and legal fees, entail less disruption of target activities and are typically less controversial than hostile acquisition, but the market does not seem to distinguish between friendly and hostile acquisitions in the short term. We study the long-term performance and risk metrics of acquirers and find that friendly acquisitions, in conjunction with other acquisition characteristics such as method of payment and mode of acquisition, tend to be risk increasing transactions and may also show a decrease in long-term post-acquisition abnormal performance.

Keywords: acquisition, cash flow, performance, risk

JEL Classification: G14, G34

working papers series


Date posted: July 9, 2007 ; Last revised: May 31, 2009

Suggested Citation

Dube, Sema, Glascock, John L. and Romero, Rafael, Does it Pay for Acquirers to Be Friendly? (2008). Corporate Ownership and Control, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 327-342. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999143

Contact Information

Sema Dube
Yeditepe University ( email )
81120 Kayisdagi, Istanbul
Turkey
John L. Glascock (Contact Author)
University of Connecticut ( email )
368 Fairfield Road
Storrs, CT 06269-2041
United States
European Business School ( email )
Gustav-Stresemann-Ring 3
Wiesbaden, Hessen 65189
Germany
Rafael Romero
SUNY Institute of Technology ( email )
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 473

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.391 seconds