Managerial Influencing of Boards of Directors
Texas Christian University
June 7, 2009
Journal of Management Accounting Research, Forthcoming
In this paper, I examine issues relating to managers' ability to influence their performance evaluation. In contrast to conventional wisdom, I show that such influencing is not necessarily deleterious to shareholder welfare, despite the fact that it is aimed at maximizing the managers' compensation. In particular, I show that the managers' influencing actions can, under some conditions, improve the performance evaluation process. This mitigates the control problem between the boards of directors and managers and lowers managerial compensation costs. I also show that the managers' influencing actions can alleviate the need for costly board equity awards -- to align board interests with those of the shareholders. This suggests that boards with smaller equity stakes may not necessarily have weaker incentives to monitor managers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 39
Keywords: Board of directors, corporate governance, influencing, monitoring
JEL Classification: D80, G34, M40, M41, M46, J33
Date posted: July 11, 2007 ; Last revised: June 8, 2009
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.359 seconds