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Reasons: Explanatory and NormativeJoseph RazUniversity of Oxford - Faculty of Law; Columbia University - Law School March 2007 Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13/2007 Abstract: A thesis familiar by being as often disputed as defended has it that intentional action is action for a reason. The present paper contributes to the defence of a weaker version of it, namely: Acting with an intention or a purpose is acting (as things appear to one) for a reason.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25 Keywords: Jurisprudence, Reasons working papers seriesDate posted: July 11, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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