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Reasons: Practical and Adaptive

Joseph Raz

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; Columbia University - Law School; King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of Law

July 2007

Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12/2007

The paper argues that normative reasons are of two fundamental kinds, practical which are value related, and adaptive, which are not related to any value, but indicate how our beliefs and emotions should adjust to fit how things are in the world. The distinction is applied and defended, in part through an additional distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (for actions, intentions, emotions or belief).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Jurisprudence, Reasons, Normative reasons

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Date posted: July 11, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Raz, Joseph, Reasons: Practical and Adaptive (July 2007). Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12/2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999870 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.999870

Contact Information

Joseph Raz (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )
St. Cross Building
St. Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UJ
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://josephnraz.googlepages.com/home
Columbia University - Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
HOME PAGE: http://josephnraz.googlepages.com/home
King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of Law ( email )
Somerset House East Wing
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

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