|
||||
|
||||
Reasons: Practical and AdaptiveJoseph RazUniversity of Oxford - Faculty of Law; Columbia University - Law School July 2007 Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12/2007 Abstract: The paper argues that normative reasons are of two fundamental kinds, practical which are value related, and adaptive, which are not related to any value, but indicate how our beliefs and emotions should adjust to fit how things are in the world. The distinction is applied and defended, in part through an additional distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (for actions, intentions, emotions or belief).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23 Keywords: Jurisprudence, Reasons, Normative reasons working papers seriesDate posted: July 11, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.422 seconds