Reasons: Practical and Adaptive
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; Columbia University - Law School; King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of Law
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12/2007
The paper argues that normative reasons are of two fundamental kinds, practical which are value related, and adaptive, which are not related to any value, but indicate how our beliefs and emotions should adjust to fit how things are in the world. The distinction is applied and defended, in part through an additional distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (for actions, intentions, emotions or belief).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23
Keywords: Jurisprudence, Reasons, Normative reasons
Date posted: July 11, 2007
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