Abstract

 
 

Footnotes (25)



 


 



Reasons: Practical and Adaptive


Joseph Raz


University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; Columbia University - Law School

July 2007

Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12/2007

Abstract:     
The paper argues that normative reasons are of two fundamental kinds, practical which are value related, and adaptive, which are not related to any value, but indicate how our beliefs and emotions should adjust to fit how things are in the world. The distinction is applied and defended, in part through an additional distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (for actions, intentions, emotions or belief).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Jurisprudence, Reasons, Normative reasons

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 11, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Raz, Joseph, Reasons: Practical and Adaptive (July 2007). Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12/2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999870 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.999870

Contact Information

Joseph Raz (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )
St. Cross Building
St. Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UJ
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://josephnraz.googlepages.com/home
Columbia University - Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
HOME PAGE: http://josephnraz.googlepages.com/home
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,641
Downloads: 676
Download Rank: 16,862
Footnotes:  25

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.422 seconds