Abstract

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The Paradox of Priority


Stanley D. Longhofer


Wichita State University - W. Frank Barton School of Business

João A. C. Santos


Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Novermber 2002


Abstract:     
The ubiquity of bank seniority is now a widely accepted fact in the academic literature. At the same time, trade creditors are sometimes granted a purchase money security interest in the materials or equipment they provide the firm. These two conflicting facts present a puzzle: Why would banks willingly give up a valuable priority claim on the firm, but only with respect to a subset of the firm's assets; We propose a resolution to this paradox of priority by arguing that trade creditors are better able to liquidate the materials they supply to a firm. When trade creditors have a security interest in these assets, their claims are state-contingent, and therefore dependent on the value of the assets pledged as collateral. Surprisingly, this ability of trade creditors to more efficiently liquidate the materials they supply to a firm also makes it desirable to subordinate the non-collateralized portion of their claims. Doing so increases the face value of a trade creditor's claim for a given level of borrowing, thereby increasing the "liquidation bang" from each trade credit buck. This combined priority structure maximizes social welfare by reducing the firm's overall cost of funding.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

JEL Classification: G21, G32

working papers series





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Date posted: January 15, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Longhofer, Stanley D. and Santos, João A. C., The Paradox of Priority (Novermber 2002). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=253165 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.253165

Contact Information

Stanley D. Longhofer (Contact Author)
Wichita State University - W. Frank Barton School of Business ( email )
1845 N. Fairmount
Wichita, KS 67260
United States
316-978-7120 (Phone)
316-978-3263 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://webs.wichita.edu/longhofer
João A. C. Santos
Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
212-720-5583 (Phone)
212-720-8363 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: HTTP://WWW.NEWYORKFED.ORG/RMAGHOME/ECONOMIST/SANTOS/CONTACT.HTML
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