Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=182169
 
 

References (119)



 
 

Citations (78)



 
 

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The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets


Bernard S. Black


Northwestern University - School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


As published in UCLA Law Review, Vol. 48, pp. 781-855, 2001

Abstract:     
An important challenge for all economies, at which only a few have succeeded, is creating the preconditions for a strong market for common stocks and other securities. A strong securities market rests on a complex network of legal and market institutions that ensure that minority shareholders (1) receive good information about the value of a company's business and (2) have confidence that a company's managers and controlling shareholders won't cheat them out of most or all of the value of their investment. A country whose laws and related institutions fail on either count cannot develop a strong securities market, forcing firms to rely on internal financing or bank financing - both of which have important shortcomings. In this Article, Professor Bernard Black explains why these two investor protection issues are critical, related, and hard to solve. He discusses which laws and institutions are most important for each, which of these laws and institutions can be borrowed from countries with strong securities markets, and which must be homegrown.

A shorter and earlier version of this article was published as "The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets," Business Lawyer, Vol. 55, pp. 1565-1607, 2000. This earlier article is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=231120

Number of Pages in PDF File: 75

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Date posted: October 6, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Black, Bernard S., The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets. As published in UCLA Law Review, Vol. 48, pp. 781-855, 2001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=182169 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.182169

Contact Information

Bernard S. Black (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
512-503-2784 (Phone)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5049 (Phone)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Brussels
Belgium
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