SUSAN J. STABILE, University of St. Thomas - School of Law (Minnesota)
Email: stabiles@stjohns.edu

Catholic Feminist Legal Theory has much to contribute to our analysis of various social, political and legal issues. However, in order for a Catholic Feminist Legal Theory to make a contribution to the dialogue about issues of law and public policy, it has to be able to speak effectively to those outside of the faith tradition. In particular, it has to get past the instinctive reaction of many people that a Catholic feminist theory cannot be reconciled with secular feminist theory.

The question addressed in this Article is whether it is possible for a Catholic Feminist Legal Theory to be taken seriously by secular feminists and other legal scholars. The Article identifies and discusses some of the major challenges to the articulation of a persuasive Catholic Feminist Legal Theory to a non-Catholic feminist audience. With respect to each of the issues identified as a challenge to secular feminists, my focus in this Article is not whether the Church's position on the issue in question is correct. Rather, the focus is whether the position of the Church on the issue can be shown to be grounded in truth claims that do not sound in subordination of women or otherwise do violence to the aims of secular feminists.

The Article addresses five issues: (1) the place and role of Mary within Catholicism; (2) a historical narrative of subordination in the Church; and the Church's position on (3) contraception, (4) marriage and family and (5) the ordination of women. It concludes that the first two of those issues, properly understood, do not present any problem from a secular feminist perspective. With respect to the third and fourth issues, it concludes that although the Church's positions on contraception and marriage/family are grounded in claims that do not on the surface seem inherently oppressive to women, the positions do imply a view of homosexuality that will be difficult for secular feminists to accept. Compounding the difficulty, the fifth issue, ordination presents a more directly challenging problem from a secular perspective. Thus, ultimately I am pessimistic about the ability of a Catholic Feminist Legal Theory to be able to engage in meaningful dialogue with secular feminists.

JOHN WITTE, Emory University School of Law
Email: jwitte@law.emory.edu
JOEL A. NICHOLS, Univ. of St. Thomas School of Law (MN)
Email: janichols1@stthomas.edu

In 1841, the American jurist Joseph Story noted that marriage is something more than a mere contract. Justice Story's writings embody an American common law refrain, namely that marriage is at once a contract and something more. This Article details the historical roots of that common law tradition. The history stems mostly from the Christian tradition, but also has antecedents and analogues in Jewish and Islamic teachings. All of these traditions have long taught that marriage is at once a contract (ketubah, pactum, and kitab) and more than a mere contract. Marriage is an institution that is both private and public, individual and social, civil and religious, temporal and transcendent. Its origin, nature, and purpose lie beyond and beneath the terms of the marriage contract itself. The idea of covenant is emerging in Western law, theology, and ethics as a common inter-religious and interdisciplinary term to capture some of the higher dimensions of marriage.

Historically, the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions found ways to reconcile the contractual and covenantal dimensions of marriage, but American law today juxtaposes them and has moved much more toward a straight contractual model. In all but three states, parties who wish to marry must choose the state's contract marriage option. In Louisiana, Arkansas, and Arizona, though, parties may choose contract marriage or covenant marriage, which has tighter marital formation and dissolution rules. But even in those three states, there is not yet a robust legal appreciation and reification of some religious covenantal notions of marriage (and current conflict of laws rules do not favor the enforcement of covenant marriage laws in inter-state disputes). Ultimately, a fuller legal response may well be necessary to recapture the multi-layered dimensions of marriage. America's religious communities may need to draw upon and reformulate their own norms and resources, and American states, in turn, may need to think more seriously about granting greater deference to the marital laws and customs of legitimate religious and cultural groups that cannot accept a marriage law of the common denominator.

AMANDA ROBINSON, affiliation not provided to SSRN
KIRSTY HUDSON, affiliation not provided to SSRN
FIONA BROOKMAN, affiliation not provided to SSRN

The current policy climate in Britain requires that agencies work together to improve their performance and provide a better service to clients. This is especially apparent in recent initiatives designed to improve the services afforded to victims of crime. Whilst there is an established literature dealing with both the potential benefits of, and challenges posed by, multi-agency work (for example, Crawford 1997; Hughes 2007; Maguire 2004; Pearson et al. 1992; Taylor 2003), the unique issues arising from multi-agency partnerships dealing with sexual violence have received less attention, even though the interface of criminal justice and health is a relatively new and unusual phenomenon warranting scrutiny. For the current study, interviews with professionals working together to develop a Sexual Assault Referral Centre (SARC) were conducted to address this gap. Positive aspects of multi-agency work identified by the respondents included: a shared concern over the poor quality of existing arrangements; a shared vision for a better response to victims; sharing a broader view of the victim; and having experience with, and commitment to, multi-agency work. Continuing challenges were noted as: sustained multi-agency participation; diverse agency cultures; competing agendas and priorities across agencies and systems; funding and staffing issues; and future responsibility for, and ownership of, the SARC. Implications of the research are discussed.

RUBY LOVE LEE, Hastings Women's Law Journal, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
Email: womenslj@uchastings.edu

A student note on comparative commercial surrogacy laws in India, U.S., Europe and Israel.

ALEXIS SNYDER, Pennsylvania State University
Email: ais127@psu.edu

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in the case of DeJohn v. Temple University, 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court held that Temple University's Student Code of Conduct and Policy on Sexual Harassment were facially unconstitutional because they were overly broad and prohibited speech which is protected by the First Amendment.

In response to the DeJohn decision, colleges and universities within the Third Circuit will be required to modify, and perhaps severely limit, their own student harassment policies. This comment will attempt to determine, based on the language in the DeJohn opinion and in several other applicable opinions, how narrow those policies must be to withstand Constitutional scrutiny.

This Comment will begin by summarizing the important case law regarding limitations on student speech in educational settings. The Comment will next analyze the language of the DeJohn opinion with the goal of understanding what proscriptions are now permissible and impermissible in campus harassment policies. The Comment will then note several questions which the DeJohn court did not resolve. Finally, the Comment will propose a sample Sexual Harassment Policy which is likely, based on the DeJohn opinion, to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. The Comment will predict that although many university harassment policies will have to be more narrowly tailored than they were before DeJohn, they will still be able to meet the institutions' need to maintain non-hostile learning environments.