PATRICK ANDREOLI VERSBACH, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich - Munich Graduate School of Economics (MGSE)
Email: patrick.andreoli-versbach@imprs-ci.ip.mpg.de
FRANK MUELLER-LANGER, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, International Max Planck Research School for Competition and Innovation (IMPRS-CI)
Email: frank.mueller-langer@ip.mpg.de

We provide evidence for the status quo in economics with respect to data sharing using a unique data set with 488 hand-collected observations randomly taken from researchers' academic webpages. Out of the sample, 435 researchers (89.14%) neither have a data&code section nor indicate whether and where their data is available. We find that 8.81% of researchers share some of their data whereas only 2.05% fully share. We run an ordered probit regression to relate the decision of researchers to share to their observable characteristics. We find that three predictors are positive and significant across specifications: being full professor, working at a higher-ranked institution and personal attitudes towards sharing as indicated by sharing other material such as lecture slides.

CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI) - University of Strasbourg, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law
Email: christophe.geiger@ceipi.edu

The social function is inherent to any legal rule. It allows for the rights of individuals to be weighed against competing rights. Being part of a broader legal system, these rights must always be put in context with other rights of equal value and with collective interests. Insisting on the social function of intellectual property rights thus amounts to identifying a need for moderation and balance in their conception and implementation - a need that has sometimes been lost sight of in recent developments. Therefore, taking into closer consideration the social function of intellectual property rights might help counter and mitigate certain expansionist tendencies in current legislation. In a time when intellectual property rights are facing a serious crisis of legitimacy, the restoration of their social function puts universal ethical principles at the heart of the debate, which can only in the long term contribute to re-establishing their public acceptance.

SILKE VON LEWINSKI, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law
Email: svl@ip.mpg.de

In June 2012, the Beijing Diplomatic Conference of the WIPO adopted the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances. This is the first international treaty covering a comprehensive protection of audiovisual performances, which have been largely excluded from protection under the Rome Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and the WPPT. It largely follows the provisions of the WPPT, and includes an article on the transfer of rights from the performer to the film producer, which leaves discretion to Connecting States how (if at all) to regulate this issue. The Treaty will enter into force upon 30 ratifications. This article presents the development and contents of the Treaty by way of a first assessment.

RETO HILTY, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law
Email: hilty@ip.mpg.de
SYLVIE NÉRISSON, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law
Email: sylvie.nerisson@ip.mpg.de

This chapter gives an overview of the impact of digitization on the current activities of Collective Management Organizations and provides perspectives on the future of collective rights management in Europe.

First, an introduction shows how the traditional system works, namely, by limiting the freedom of contract of right holders and users on the one hand and by transforming the exclusive rights into an entitlement to remuneration for use on the other.

The second section presents the turning point of the legal framework applicable to CRMOs on the European level, a move initiated by two of the Commission's DGs (Directorates General): Internal Market and Services (DG Market) and Competition (DG Comp).

The third section will examine the current state of collective rights management in the music and visual domains.

The chapter ends with the conclusion that the collective rights management system is currently adapting to digitization notwithstanding the interventions by DG Market, especially in the music sector. In fact, the availability of copyrighted works will heavily rely on collective rights management in the future as well - if not more than ever.