Table of Contents

Access and Use: Open vs. Proprietary Worlds

Reto Hilty, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, University of Zurich, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Kaya Köklü, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

What's in the Unitary Patent Package?

Thomas Jaeger, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Open Access to Research Data: Strategic Delay and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Mandatory Data Disclosure

Frank Mueller-Langer, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Patrick Andreoli Versbach, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München - Faculty of Economics

Implementing Intellectual Property Provisions in Human Rights Instruments: Towards a New Social Contract for the Protection of Intangibles

Christophe Geiger, Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI) - University of Strasbourg, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 3 June 2014 on the Proposal of the European Commission for a Directive on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) against their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure of 28 November 2013, Com(2013) 813 Final

Roland Knaak, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Annette Kur, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Reto Hilty, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, University of Zurich, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München


MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION & COMPETITION
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

"Access and Use: Open vs. Proprietary Worlds" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-07

RETO HILTY, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, University of Zurich, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
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KAYA KÖKLÜ, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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There are good reasons to assume that an open world, which allows broad access to existing knowledge, is a better and more social world. But non-open, proprietary systems like patent or copyright laws do also have their legitimacy – particularly with regard to providing incentives for innovation and creation. The paper shows that open and proprietary worlds are not mutually exclusive but rather dependent on each other. Instead of replacing the propriety world by an open world, it is rather crucial to find a balance between both systems. In search for the right balance, it is apparent that the risk of imbalance is rather one-sided. IP rights as a matter of principle are of an exclusive nature. Hence, the risk of over-exclusiveness is more likely than over-openness. The tools to safeguard a certain degree of openness already exist. In this respect often overlooked is the importance and effectiveness of compulsory licenses.

"What's in the Unitary Patent Package?" Free Download
Prepared for the Conference “Regional and EU Intellectual Property Challenges?, 6 June 2014, Burch University Sarajevo. Printed publication with the conference papers
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-08

THOMAS JAEGER, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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So it looks like the Unitary Patent system now finally seems to be coming. But why does it look so awkward, why is the design so peculiar and complicated? Does it live up to the expectations that were initially associated with it? This contribution takes a brief look and sketches out possible system alternatives. Whether or not they might still be coming is assessed by way of an outlook.

"Open Access to Research Data: Strategic Delay and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Mandatory Data Disclosure" Free Download
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-09

FRANK MUELLER-LANGER, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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PATRICK ANDREOLI VERSBACH, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München - Faculty of Economics
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Mandatory data disclosure is an essential feature for credible empirical work but comes at a cost: First, authors might invest less in data generation if they are not the full residual claimants of their data after their first publication. Second, authors might "strategically delay" the time of submission of papers in order to fully exploit their data in subsequent research. We analyze a three-stage model of publication and data disclosure. We derive exact conditions for positive welfare effects of mandatory data disclosure. However, we find that the transition to mandatory data disclosure has negative welfare properties if authors delay strategically.

"Implementing Intellectual Property Provisions in Human Rights Instruments: Towards a New Social Contract for the Protection of Intangibles" Free Download
Ch. Geiger (ed.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Cheltenham, UK/ Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar, 2014, Forthcoming
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-10

CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI) - University of Strasbourg, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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Despite the crucial importance of ensuring a just balance of interests within intellectual property law, a well ‘thought-out’ IP clause is still lacking in an overwhelming majority of human rights instruments. Building upon the results of an empirical study of about 200 national constitutions and several leading international and European treaties on human rights, this chapter examines how the constitutional framework is guiding the understanding and shape of IP law. In particular, it examines different model provisions for IP included in human rights instruments and puts them in the context of selected judicial practice, general principles of legal interpretation and ‘quasi-constitutional’ rules of IP protection. Several solutions are ultimately advanced which could be envisaged in the future to construct a satisfying and balanced clause for IP at the constitutional level, capable of demonstrating by its ‘mere’ wording that intellectual property is intrinsically linked to the interests of society.

"Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 3 June 2014 on the Proposal of the European Commission for a Directive on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) against their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure of 28 November 2013, Com(2013) 813 Final" Free Download
Forthcoming in: IIC: international review of intellectual property and competition law
Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-11

ROLAND KNAAK, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
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ANNETTE KUR, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Email:
RETO HILTY, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, University of Zurich, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
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The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition is a research institute within the Max Planck Society. Its main purpose is to undertake basic research on legal and economic issues on intellectual property and competition law. One main focus of its activity is the study of European intellectual property and unfair competition law. The Institute regularly advises governmental bodies and parliaments, at both the national and the international level. The Institute hereby provides its comments on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure of 28.11.2013, (COM) 813 final. All references in these Comments to the compromise proposal of the Council Presidency refer to the proposal of 19 May 2014 (Doc 9870/14).

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About this eJournal

The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper Series is a source for research papers authored by the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition academic staff (Eds.: Prof. Josef Drexl, Exec. Dir., Prof. Dietmar Harhoff, Dir., Prof. Reto M. Hilty, Dir.). Papers cover topics on intellectual property law (copyright, patent, trademark law), competition law (law of unfair competition, antitrust law), innovation research and entrepreneurship. To access all the papers in this series please use the following URL: http://www.ssrn.com/link/Max-Planck-Intellectual-RES.html

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