Table of Contents

Persuasive Signalling

Arianna Degan, University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Economics
Ming Li, Concordia University

Collapsing Confidence: Dynamic Trading with Developing Adverse Selection

Ilwoo Hwang, University of Miami

Experimental Evidence on Gender Interaction in Lying Behavior

Seeun Jung, ESSEC Business School
Radu Vranceanu, ESSEC Business School, University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA

Supply Chain Performance Assessment and Supplier and Component Importance Identification in a General Competitive Multitiered Supply Chain Network Model

Dong Li, Arkansas State University - College of Business - Department of Management and Marketing
Anna Nagurney, University of Massachusetts Amherst - Isenberg School of Management - Department of Operations and Information Management


GAME THEORY & BARGAINING THEORY eJOURNAL

"Persuasive Signalling" Free Download

ARIANNA DEGAN, University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Economics
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MING LI, Concordia University
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We present a model of persuasive signalling, where a privately-informed sender selects from a class of signals with different precision to persuade a receiver to take one of two actions. The sender’s information could be either favourable or unfavourable. The receiver observes both the sender’s choice of signal and a random realization of the signal. We characterize the set of D1 equilibria. We show that all of them must involve some pooling and any informative signal must be associated with an optimistic posterior. When the receiver is ex ante skeptical or indifferent, there is a unique D1 equilibrium, which is semi-separating and where the levels of precision are independent of the prior. Finally, we investigate the sender’s optimal persuasion policy – choice of signal before (commitment) or after (discretion) he learns his type. We show that the sender is indifferent between the commitment and discretion when the prior is optimistic, prefers discretion to commitment when the prior is sufficiently pessimistic, and could either prefer discretion or commitment when the prior is neutral.

"Collapsing Confidence: Dynamic Trading with Developing Adverse Selection" Free Download

ILWOO HWANG, University of Miami
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I study a dynamic trading game where a seller and potential buyers start out symmetrically uninformed about the quality of a good, but in which the seller becomes informed after the game begins, so that the asymmetric information between the agents develops over time. If the seller’s effective learning speed is high, the equilibrium features “collapse-and-recovery? behavior: Both the equilibrium price and the trade probability first drop and then increase over time. The buyers’ second-order belief plays an important role in equilibrium dynamics. The seller’s payoff is non-monotonic in his learning speed, which makes it possible for him to have a higher payoff when learning is slower.

"Experimental Evidence on Gender Interaction in Lying Behavior" Free Download

SEEUN JUNG, ESSEC Business School
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RADU VRANCEANU, ESSEC Business School, University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA
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The paper reports results from an Ultimatum Game experiment with asymmetric information where Proposers can send to Responders misleading information about their endowment. We allow for all possible gender combinations in the Proposer-Responder pairs. Proposer messages that underestimate the actual amount are quite widespread. The frequency of lying is slightly higher in mixed groups. Conditional on lying, men tend to state bigger lies than women. On the other hand, women tend to tell smaller lies when paired with men, than when paired with women. In general, women present higher acceptance rates than men.

"Supply Chain Performance Assessment and Supplier and Component Importance Identification in a General Competitive Multitiered Supply Chain Network Model" Free Download

DONG LI, Arkansas State University - College of Business - Department of Management and Marketing
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ANNA NAGURNEY, University of Massachusetts Amherst - Isenberg School of Management - Department of Operations and Information Management
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In this paper, we develop a multitiered competitive supply chain network game theory model, which includes the supplier tier. The firms are differentiated by brands and can produce their own components, as reflected by their capacities, and/or obtain components from one or more suppliers, who also are capacitated. The firms compete in a Cournot-Nash fashion, whereas the suppliers compete a la Bertrand since firms are sensitive to prices. All decision-makers seek to maximize their profits with consumers reflecting their preferences through the demand price functions associated with the demand markets for the firms' products. We construct supply chain network performance measures for the full supply chain and the individual firm levels that assess the efficiency of the supply chain or firm, respectively, and also allow for the identification and ranking of the importance of suppliers as well as the components of suppliers with respect to the full supply chain or individual firm. The framework is illustrated through a series of numerical supply chain network examples.

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