GAME THEORY & BARGAINING THEORY eJOURNAL
"On the Performance of Rule-Based Contribution Schemes Under Endowment Heterogeneity"
ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-055
MARTIN KESTERNICH, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)
ANDREAS LANGE, University of Hamburg, Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) - Environmental & Resource Economics
BODO STURM, HTWK Leipzig
We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, distinguishing between a random- and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the efficiency gains from minimum contribution rules under random allocation. Under effort-based allocations, substantial efficiency gains relative to a VCM occur, though being largely driven by significant reductions of contributions in VCM. By apparently influencing the perception of fair burden sharing, the endowment allocation procedure crucially impacts voluntary contributions under VCM, while the rule-based mechanisms generate stable efficiency levels, even though endowment heterogeneity substantially limits the ability of rule-based mechanisms to achieve the potential efficiency gains.
"Consistent or Balanced? On the Dynamics of Voluntary Contributions"
ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-060
CARLO GALLIER, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)
CHRISTIANE REIF, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) - Environmental and Resource Economics, Environmental Management Research
DANIEL ROEMER, University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics
We investigate the dynamic effects of a charitable lottery and an income tax on donations. The analysis is based on a two-round dictator game with the subjectâ€™s charity of choice as recipient and additional incentives in the first round only. The immediate effect of a charitable lottery leads to higher contributions and we cannot find substantial crowding out of voluntary contributions in the presence of an income tax. These economic interventions weakly spill-over to the subsequent donation decisions without additional incentives. Our results suggest the presence of consistency seeking behaviour. This is especially true for a subgroup of participants with a rule-based mind-set and our research shows the importance of the subjectsâ€™ moral framework in the context of dynamic pro-social behaviour.
"Game Theory and Auctions from Islamic Viewpoint"
ATIF JILANI, Department of Business Administration, Aligarh Muslim University
VALEED AHMAD ANSARI, Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) - Department of Business Administration
This study is an attempt to analyze game and auction theories from the perspective of Islamic shariah. Game theory permits certain acts like cheating, collusion, and unnecessary price-hiking which are in direct conflict with Islam Shariah laws and practices. Game theory needs further discussion related with Islamic Shariah in order to Islamize game theory. The theory of auction also requires further refinements to come up with auction formats that are permissible in Islamic Shariah. Implementation of Islamic Shariah is expected to minimize oppression, injustice and selfish motives from contracts of trade.
"Hobby Lobby and the Zero-Sum Game"
92 Washington University Law Review, Forthcoming
KATHRYN E. KOVACS, Rutgers School of Law - Camden
In a zero-sum game, one personâ€™s gain is another personâ€™s loss. Some claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act present such zero-sum circumstances in that easing the claimantâ€™s religious burden increases someone elseâ€™s burden. This article explores the effect of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores on such zero-sum claims using a paradigmatic example: RFRA claims challenging the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. This inquiry reveals that Hobby Lobby did not open the door for cases involving true zero-sum games, including those under the Eagle Act and some under the anti-discrimination laws. In such cases, granting the requested religious accommodation merely shifts the claimantâ€™s burden onto a third party. RFRA provides for easing burdens, not transferring them to others. Hence, even after Hobby Lobby, such zero-sum claims should fail.
"Use of Strategy Methods in Experimental Pivotalâ€?Voting Game"
Special Section: Experiments on Learning, Methods, and Voting, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 387-400, 2014
YEN KUO, National Taiwan University
JOSEPH TAOâ€?YI WANG, National Taiwan University
We use the strategy method to conduct laboratory experiments on a nineâ€?player heterogeneousâ€?cost voting game. We replicate the underdog and competition effect, but find significantly higher voter turnout rates to be only partially explained by logit quantal response equilibrium. We examine roundâ€?byâ€?round changes in cutâ€?off behaviour and find that voters are highly responsive to historical pivotal events. Voters also respond to past winning and tying, but only as a minority (upsetting the majority), demonstrating an â€˜underdog winning effectâ€™, receiving extra utility when winning as a minority. An equilibrium with such asymmetry in utility explains the high minority turnout (and high majority turnout as a best response).
"Research Among Copycats: R&D, Spillovers, and Feedback Strategies"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 14-112/II
GREGA SMRKOLJ, Newcastle University (UK) - Business School
FLORIAN O. WAGENER, University of Amsterdam - Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance (CeNDEF) - Department of Quantitative Economics, Tinbergen Institute
We study a stochastic dynamic game of process innovation in which firms can initiate and terminate R&D efforts and production at different times. We discern the impact of knowledge spillovers on the investments in existing markets, as well as on the likely structure of newly forming markets, for all possible asymmetries between firms. We show that the relation between spillovers, R&D efforts, and surpluses is non-monotonic and dependent on both the relative and absolute efficiency of firms. Larger spillovers increase the likelihood that a new technology is brought to production, but they do not necessarily make the industry more competitive.
About this eJournal
This eJournal distributes working and accepted paper abstracts of empirical and theoretical papers on game theory, defined as the study of the strategic interaction among rational agents in competitive and cooperative environments, and bargaining theory, defined as a situation in which two or more players have a common interest to co-operate, but have conflicting interests over exactly how to co-operate. The topics in this eJournal include all of the subjects in Section C7 of the JEL classification system.
Editor: Victor Ricciardi, Goucher College
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