MATEUSZ BÅ?ACHUCKI, Polish Academy of Sciences (INP PAN) - Institute of Law Studies
Email: mateusz.blachucki@inp.pan.pl

The aim of this publication is to present foreign readers with the first English course on Polish competition law. The book consists of three parts. First is a monographic presentation of the Polish antimonopoly law. The considerations are not, however, limited to the antimonopoly act in force. Presentation of the current model of the competition law is preceded by the comprehensive theoretical study laying down the origins and basic definitions of contemporary Polish antimonopoly law. The second part is a selection of judicial case law in competition cases. Its role is to provide a reader with a practical insight into how the competition law is applied by the courts and what are the most important issues developed by the judiciary. The last part brings basic legal texts. It enables readers to confront the theoretical background and the case law with actual wording of relevant regulations or soft law documents. A combination of these three parts aims at giving an overview of the Polish competition law. The three parts supplement each other and are cross-referenced. Such method allows avoiding duplication of certain contents. Therefore it is suggested to study all three parts in parallel in order to get the more comprehensive view of the presented issues.

BILAL SAYYED, George Mason University School of Law, Kirkland & Ellis - Washington, D.C. Office
Email: bsayyed@gmu.edu

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act) requires that acquisitions of voting securities, assets, or non-corporate entities be notified to the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice (the Agencies). While the Act has had a positive effect on the ability of the Agencies to identify, remedy, and, if necessary, to enjoin anticompetitive mergers, it has also imposed costs, some of which are unnecessary for accomplishing the Act’s purpose. The Act may also restrict or discourage shareholders from interacting with management. Because of the narrow reading of the investment-only exemption, such interaction may preclude reliance on the exemption. This disincentive runs counter to policies that encourage more communication between shareholders and management. This article suggests that the “investment-only� exemption should be replaced with a modest exemption for most acquisitions of a de minimis percentage of an issuer’s outstanding voting securities. Specifically, the investment-only exemption should be replaced with an alternative exemption for de minimis investments in issuers that are not competitors of the acquiring person, the acquiring person’s associates, or of entities in which the acquiring person or its associates have substantial holdings.

YEE WAH CHIN, Ingram Yuzek Gainen Carroll & Bertolotti, LLP
Email: ywchin@alum.mit.edu

IP monetization refers to a wide range of activities to realize value from intellectual property rights ownership. It includes traditional licenses, IP auctions, investors that finance IP development or litigation, patent assertion entities (PAEs), patent pools, strategic IP acquisition companies and invention capital companies that provide capital and expertise to develop inventions in which they then hold an interest. These various IP monetization activities generally involve some form of acquisition of IP rights, either by license or assignment, and the realization of revenues from those IP rights, either by license or recovery of infringement damages. Traditional licenses, IP auctions, PAEs, pools, and IP acquisition companies all fall within one or both of these categories. Antitrust risks arise in the aggregation and licensing of IP rights. This article reviews the general principles in the antitrust analysis of typical IP monetization transactions.