Table of Contents

Band Agents: Addressing Collective Action Problems in Fragmented Spectrum Bands

J. Pierre de Vries, University of Colorado at Boulder Law School - Silicon Flatirons Center

When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law

Patrice Bougette, University of Nice Sophia Antipolis - Law, Economics, and Management Research Group (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG)
Marc Deschamps, Université de Lorraine, University of Strasbourg - Bureau of Economic Theory and Application (BETA)
Frédéric M. Marty, Research Group on Law, Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG)

The Deterrent Effect of Anti-Cartel Enforcement: A Tale of Two Tails

S. W. Davies, University of East Anglia (UEA)
Peter L. Ormosi, University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy, Norwich Business School

Fragmentation of the Single Market for On-Line Video-on-Demand Services: Point of View of Content Providers

Heritiana Ranaivoson, Free University of Brussels (VUB) - IBBT-SMIT


ANTITRUST: ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY eJOURNAL

"Band Agents: Addressing Collective Action Problems in Fragmented Spectrum Bands" Free Download

J. PIERRE DE VRIES, University of Colorado at Boulder Law School - Silicon Flatirons Center
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Many spectrum bands are significantly fragmented, i.e. they are shared among many licensees and/or diverse service allocations that have equal rights. This poses a significant barrier to rearranging operating rights among band neighbors in ways that generate value for the parties and society at large. This paper describes how band classes (groups of licensees or other band users with common interests) and band agents (entities that act on behalf of the members of a band class) formed under regulatory auspices can address this collective action problem.

Band agents would hold the right to negotiate alterations in operating rights at band boundaries, the ability to make or accept payments, and the power to oblige the operators they represent to conform to these changes; all other rights would remain vested as before. Band agents can be thought of as band managers or frequency coordinators with additional powers.

Band classes are opt-out; principals designated as members of a class would have to make an explicit decision not to participate. Band classes and band agents would be subject to ex ante certification by the regulator, and the agreements that they reach with band neighbors could be submitted for yes/no review by the regulator.

Such a regime could be implemented in various ways, including a band agent organizing a band class under these rules on its own initiative; the regulator converting existing entities such as frequency coordinators, SAS administrators or federal agencies to band agent status; or by auctioning of band agent rights in new allocations.

"When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law" Free Download
GREDEG Working Paper No. 2014-23

PATRICE BOUGETTE, University of Nice Sophia Antipolis - Law, Economics, and Management Research Group (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG)
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MARC DESCHAMPS, Université de Lorraine, University of Strasbourg - Bureau of Economic Theory and Application (BETA)
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FRÉDÉRIC M. MARTY, Research Group on Law, Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG)
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In this article, we use a history of economic thought perspective to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the US. We show the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped antitrust laws in their inception. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition laws, we then highlight U.S. economists' very cautious views about antitrust until the Second New Deal. We analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. We rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm was made collective, i.e. the 'economization' process took place in US antitrust. Finally, we discuss the implications, if not the possible pitfalls, of such a conversion to economics-led competition law enforcement.

"The Deterrent Effect of Anti-Cartel Enforcement: A Tale of Two Tails" Free Download

S. W. DAVIES, University of East Anglia (UEA)
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PETER L. ORMOSI, University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy, Norwich Business School
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This paper investigates how anti-cartel enforcement deters consumer harm. First, it draws on a theoretical model to establish the conditions of deterrence increasing or decreasing with the harm caused by cartels. Empirically, the paper uses cartel overcharges as a measure of harm and employs time periods when cartels were legal to capture a world without deterrence. Evidence is provided that the lowest and the highest harm cartels are the most likely to be deterred.

"Fragmentation of the Single Market for On-Line Video-on-Demand Services: Point of View of Content Providers" Free Download

HERITIANA RANAIVOSON, Free University of Brussels (VUB) - IBBT-SMIT
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The study examines the factors of success and the factors of fragmentation. In doing so, the study aims at reflecting the interviewees’ perspectives, in particular in Section 3 and 4. Section 5 critically evaluates some of their statements.

The study concludes that VoD services face many obstacles in their development, related to the fact that the VoD market is far from being established. VoD services are in search for profitable and sustainable business models and need to be inserted in complex value chains where stronger players sometimes use their market power to keep their strong position. Recommendations include: better technical infrastructure, support for standards, facilitation of online payment, digitization of archive, anti-trust regulation. VoD services also face many constraints that limit their cross-border activity. Regulatory harmonisation was seen by the interviewees as potentially able to further promote cross-border activity of VoD services.

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ANTITRUST & REGULATED INDUSTRIES EJOURNALS

BERNARD S. BLACK
Northwestern University - School of Law, Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Email: bblack@northwestern.edu

RONALD J. GILSON
Stanford Law School, Columbia Law School, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
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Advisory Board

Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal

JAMES R. ATWOOD
Covington & Burling

JONATHAN B. BAKER
Professor of Law, American University - Washington College of Law

MAXWELL M. BLECHER
Attorney at Law, Blecher and Collins

DENNIS W. CARLTON
Professor, University of Chicago - Booth School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School

NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES
Executive Director, Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications Institute, Professor of Economics, New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics

EINER R. ELHAUGE
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School

ELEANOR M. FOX
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law

HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP
Professor, University of Iowa - College of Law

LOUIS KAPLOW
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

DANIEL L. RUBINFELD
Professor, University of California at Berkeley - School of Law, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), NYU Law School

CARL SHAPIRO
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business