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BEHAVIORAL & EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS eJOURNAL"Sorting Via Screening Versus Signaling: A Theoretic and Experimental Comparison"
WERNER GUTH, Max Planck Institute of Economics, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Similar to Kübler et al. (2008, GEB 64, p. 219-236), we compare sorting in games with asymmetric incomplete information theoretically and experimentally. Rather than distinguishing two very different sequential games, we use the same game format and capture the structural difference of screening and signaling only via their payoff specification. The experiment thus relies on the same verbal instructions. Although the equilibrium outcomes coincide, greater efficiency of screening, compared to signaling, off the equilibrium play is predicted and confirmed experimentally. "Rational Anchoring in Economic Valuations"
LIANG GUO, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Marketing We challenge the interpretation of the anchoring effect as evidence that preferences are non-existing or arbitrary. If product value is ex ante imperfectly known, experiment subjects can engage in information-gathering activities (i.e., deliberation) before stating their valuation. We show that endogenous deliberation can mediate the spurious correlation between arbitrarily generated anchors and experimentally elicited valuations. Consequently, the anchoring of economic valuations may simply be a disguise for the mediation of deliberation in the elicitation of valuations. Moreover, the anchoring effect can be non-monotonic, and we therefore highlight the importance of explicitly measuring deliberation to adequately uncover the anchoring of valuations.
ANDREW J. LEIDNER, Texas A&M University (TAMU) - Department of Agricultural Economics This study develops a two-stage regression model to investigate household and respondent characteristics as they contribute to aversion behavior to reduce exposure to arsenic-contaminated groundwater. The aversion activity under study is the implementation of a household-level point-of-use filtration device. Since the acquisition of arsenic-contamination information and the engagement in an activity that avert arsenic-related health risks may be co-determined, a two-stage propensity-score model is developed. In the first stage, the propensity for households to acquire of arsenic contamination information is estimated. Then, the propensity scores are used to weight observations in a probit regression on the decision to avert the arsenic-related health risk. Of four potential sources of information: utility, media, friend, or other; only information received from a friend is found to be statistically significant in the two-stage model. Other statistically significant covariates in the household’s decision to avert contamination include: reported household income, the presence of children in a household, and region-level indicator variables. | ||||||||
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About this eJournal
This eJournal distributes working and accepted paper abstracts covering various aspects of behavioral and experimental economics. The objective of this eJournal is to foster insight into the cognitive and affective (emotional) factors that influence the human judgment and decision making process. The discipline of behavioral economics focuses on why individuals make decisions which appear to reflect bounded rationality, quasi rationality, and irrational behavior. This eJournal disseminates research that integrates the methods used in behavioral decision theory with the ones long established in traditional economics.
SubmissionsTo submit your research to SSRN, sign in to the SSRN User HeadQuarters, click the My Papers link on left menu and then the Start New Submission button at top of page. Distribution ServicesIf your organization is interested in increasing readership for its research by starting a Research Paper Series, or sponsoring a Subject Matter eJournal, please email: RPS@SSRN.com Distributed byDirectorsERN SUBJECT MATTER EJOURNALS MICHAEL C. JENSEN Please contact us at the above addresses with your comments, questions or suggestions for ERN-Sub. Advisory BoardBehavioral & Experimental Economics eJournal MORRIS ALTMAN GERRIT ANTONIDES OFER H. AZAR COLIN F. CAMERER WERNER F.M. DEBONDT CATHERINE C. ECKEL RICHARD G. FRANK URI GNEEZY CLAIRE ARIANE HILL CATHLEEN AMANDA JOHNSON DANIEL KAHNEMAN BIJOU YANG LESTER JOHN A. LIST GEORGE F. LOEWENSTEIN ROBERT J. OXOBY JOOST M. E. PENNINGS MICHAEL J. ROSZKOWSKI HUGH H. SCHWARTZ ANDREI SHLEIFER PAUL SLOVIC GLENN E. SNELBECKER CASS R. SUNSTEIN RICHARD H. THALER JOHN F. TOMER PAUL J. ZAK JASON ZWEIG
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