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The Role of Government in Voluntary Environmental Programs: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)

Jeroen van der Heijden, Senior Research Fellow, Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet), School of Regulation, Justice and Diplomacy, Australian National University (ANU), Assistant Professor, Amsterdam Law School, University of Amsterdam

Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering When Countries are Asymmetric

Vassiliki Manoussi, Athens University of Economics and Business
Anastasios Xepapadeas, Athens University of Economics and Business

Adaptation for Mitigation

Masako Ikefuji, University of Southern Denmark - Department of Environmental and Business Economics
J.R. Magnus, VU University Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Hiroaki Sakamoto, Waseda University - School of Social Science

Generous Sustainability

Reyer Gerlagh, Tilburg University - Center and Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

An Options Pricing Approach to Ramping Rate Restrictions at Hydro Power Plants

Shilei Niu, University of Waterloo - Department of Economics
Margaret C. Insley, University of Waterloo - Department of Economics


ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS eJOURNAL

"The Role of Government in Voluntary Environmental Programs: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)" Free Download
Forthcoming in Public Administration
RegNet Research Paper No. 2014/57

JEROEN VAN DER HEIJDEN, Senior Research Fellow, Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet), School of Regulation, Justice and Diplomacy, Australian National University (ANU), Assistant Professor, Amsterdam Law School, University of Amsterdam
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Voluntary Environmental Programs (VEPs) have become increasingly popular in addressing environmental risks that are too complex to solve through traditional direct regulatory interventions. Whilst VEPs have attracted much scholarly attention, little is known about how they cause their outcomes. This article seeks to better understand whether and how the roles of governments in VEPs affect their outcomes in terms of (i) attracting participants, and (ii) their contribution to a desired collective end. Using fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) this article addresses a series of 31 VEPs in the building sectors of Australia, the Netherlands, and the United States. It is particularly interested to better understand what configurations of five specific governmental roles in VEPs are sufficient to attract participants and contribute to a desired collective end. It uncovers three ideal type roles for governments in VEPs that are positively related to the two outcomes under scrutiny.

"Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering When Countries are Asymmetric" Free Download
FEEM Working Paper Forthcoming

VASSILIKI MANOUSSI, Athens University of Economics and Business
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ANASTASIOS XEPAPADEAS, Athens University of Economics and Business
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We study a dynamic game of climate policy design in terms of emissions and solar radiation management (SRM) involving two heterogeneous regions or countries. Countries emit greenhouse gasses (GHGs), and can block incoming radiation by unilateral SRM activities, thus reducing global temperature. Heterogeneity is modelled in terms of the social cost of SRM, the environmental damages due to global warming, the productivity of emissions in terms of generating private benefits, the rate of impatience, and the private cost of geoengineering. We determine the impact of asymmetry on mitigation and SRM activities, concentration of GHGs, and global temperature, and we examine whether a trade-off actually emerges between mitigation and SRM. Our results could provide some insights into a currently emerging debate regarding mitigation and SRM methods to control climate change, especially since asymmetries seem to play an important role in affecting incentives for cooperation or unilateral actions.

"Adaptation for Mitigation" Free Download
FEEM Working Paper No. 102.2014

MASAKO IKEFUJI, University of Southern Denmark - Department of Environmental and Business Economics
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J.R. MAGNUS, VU University Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
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HIROAKI SAKAMOTO, Waseda University - School of Social Science
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This paper develops a dynamic model consisting of two regions (North and South), in which the accumulation of human capital is negatively influenced by the global stock of pollution. By characterizing the equilibrium strategy of each region, we show that the regions’ best responses can be strategic complements through a dynamic complementarity effect. The model is used to analyze the impact of adaptation assistance from North to South. It is shown that North’s unilateral assistance to South (thus enhancing South’s adaptation capacity) can facilitate pollution mitigation in both regions, especially when the assistance is targeted at human capital protection.

"Generous Sustainability" Free Download
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5092

REYER GERLAGH, Tilburg University - Center and Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
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I define “generous sustainability? as a combination of two conditions: neither instantaneous maximin income nor attainable maximin income should decrease over time. I provide a formal definition and study applications to an AK economy, a Ramsey economy, and a Climate Economy. Generosity is shown to impose substantially stronger conditions on current actions compared to existing sustainability concepts. As a rule of thumb, generosity requires that GHG emissions are limited to levels that do not cause irreversible system damages if some group of people systematically value these systems.

"An Options Pricing Approach to Ramping Rate Restrictions at Hydro Power Plants" Free Download

SHILEI NIU, University of Waterloo - Department of Economics
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MARGARET C. INSLEY, University of Waterloo - Department of Economics
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This paper uses a real options approach to examine the impact of ramping rate restrictions imposed on hydro operations to protect aquatic ecosystems. We consider the effect on profits from electricity generation in order to inform policy decisions about ramping rate restrictions. A novelty of the paper is in examining the optimal operation of a prototype hydro power plant with electricity prices modelled as a regime switching process. We show that profits are negatively affected by ramping restrictions, but the extent of the impact depends on key parameters which determine the desirability of frequent changes in water release rates. Interestingly for the case considered, profit is not sensitive to ramping restrictions over a large range of restrictions. The results point to the importance of accurately modelling electricity prices in gauging the trade offs involved in imposing restrictions on hydro operators which may hinder their ability to respond to volatile electricity prices and meet peak demands.

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About this eJournal

This eJournal distributes working and accepted paper abstracts in the full range of subjects that comprise Environmental Economics. Topics include economic causes and consequences of environmental changes; tax and regulatory policies that affect the environment; markets for pollution rights and related issues; government policies toward the environment; valuation of environmental resources, "green accounting" and intergovernmental cooperation in environmental policy.

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Environmental Economics eJournal

DON FULLERTON
Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Finance, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

LAWRENCE H. GOULDER
Shuzo Nishihara Professor of Environmental and Resource Economics, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), University Fellow, Resources for the Future

WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS
Yale University - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

PAUL R. PORTNEY
University of Arizona - Eller College of Management

ROBERT N. STAVINS
Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), University Fellow, Resources for the Future, Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

TOM TIETENBERG
Mitchell Family Professor of Economics, Colby College - Department of Economics