Table of Contents

Does Military Draft Discourage Enrollment in Higher Education? Evidence from OECD Countries

Katarina R. I. Keller, Susquehanna University
Panu Poutvaara, University of Helsinki - Department of Economics, Helsinki Center of Economic Research (HECER), Center for Economic and Business Research (CEBR), CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research), Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Andreas Wagener, University of Hannover - Economics and Business Administration Area, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research), University of Vienna - Department of Economics

Assortative Mating and Divorce: Evidence from Austrian Register Data

Wolfgang Frimmel, University of Linz
Martin Halla, Johannes Kepler University - Department of Economics, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Johannes Kepler University - Department of Economics, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

The Short-Term Impacts of a Schooling Conditional Cash Transfer Program on the Sexual Behavior of Young Women

Sarah Baird, George Washington University
Ephraim W. Chirwa, University of Malawi
Craig McIntosh, University of California, San Diego - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS)
Berk Özler, World Bank - Development Economics Research Group (DECRG)

Outrunning the Gender Gap - Boys and Girls Compete Equally

Anna Dreber, Institute for Financial Research (SIFR)
Emma von Essen, affiliation not provided to SSRN
eva ranehill, Stockholm School of Economics

Investigating Motives Behind Punishment and Sacrifice: A Within-Subject Analysis

Luke Garrod, University of East Anglia - ESRC Centre for Competition Policy and School of Economics


BEHAVIORAL & EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS ABSTRACTS

"Does Military Draft Discourage Enrollment in Higher Education? Evidence from OECD Countries" Free Download
IZA Discussion Paper No. 4399

KATARINA R. I. KELLER, Susquehanna University
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PANU POUTVAARA, University of Helsinki - Department of Economics, Helsinki Center of Economic Research (HECER), Center for Economic and Business Research (CEBR), CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research), Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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ANDREAS WAGENER, University of Hannover - Economics and Business Administration Area, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research), University of Vienna - Department of Economics
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Using data from 1960-2000 for OECD countries, we analyze the impact of compulsory military service on the demand for higher education, measured by students enrolled in tertiary education as a share of the working-age population. Based on a theoretical model, we hypothesize that military draft has a negative effect on education. Empirically, we confirm this for the existence of conscription, albeit usually at low statistical significance. However, the intensity of its enforcement, measured by the share of the labor force conscripted by the military and the duration of service, significantly reduces enrollment in higher education.

"Assortative Mating and Divorce: Evidence from Austrian Register Data" Free Download
IZA Discussion Paper No. 4446

WOLFGANG FRIMMEL, University of Linz
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MARTIN HALLA, Johannes Kepler University - Department of Economics, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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RUDOLF WINTER-EBMER, Johannes Kepler University - Department of Economics, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
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This paper documents that changes in assortative mating patterns over the last four decades along the dimensions of age, ethnicity and religion are not responsible for the increasing marital stability in Austria. Quite the contrary, without the rise in the age at marriage, divorce rates would be considerably higher. Immigration and secularization, and the resulting supply of spouses with diverse ethnicity and religious denominations had no overall effect on divorce rates. Countervailing effects ï¾– in line with theoretical predictions ï¾– offset each other. The rise in the incidence in divorce is most probably caused by changing social norms.

"The Short-Term Impacts of a Schooling Conditional Cash Transfer Program on the Sexual Behavior of Young Women" Free Download
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5089

SARAH BAIRD, George Washington University
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EPHRAIM W. CHIRWA, University of Malawi
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CRAIG MCINTOSH, University of California, San Diego - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS)
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BERK ÖZLER, World Bank - Development Economics Research Group (DECRG)
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Recent evidence suggests that conditional cash transfer programs for schooling are effective in raising school enrollment and attendance. However, there is also reason to believe that such programs can affect other outcomes, such as the sexual behavior of their young beneficiaries. Zomba Cash Transfer Program is a randomized, ongoing conditional cash transfer intervention targeting young women in Malawi that provides incentives (in the form of school fees and cash transfers) to current schoolgirls and recent dropouts to stay in or return to school. An average offer of US$10/month conditional on satisfactory school attendance - plus direct payment of secondary school fees - led to significant declines in early marriage, teenage pregnancy, and self-reported sexual activity among program beneficiaries after just one year of program implementation. For program beneficiaries who were out of school at baseline, the probability of getting married and becoming pregnant declined by more than 40 percent and 30 percent, respectively. In addition, the incidence of the onset of sexual activity was 38 percent lower among all program beneficiaries than the control group. Overall, these results suggest that conditional cash transfer programs not only serve as useful tools for improving school attendance, but may also reduce sexual activity, teen pregnancy, and early marriage.

"Outrunning the Gender Gap - Boys and Girls Compete Equally" Free Download
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No 709

ANNA DREBER, Institute for Financial Research (SIFR)
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EMMA VON ESSEN, affiliation not provided to SSRN
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EVA RANEHILL, Stockholm School of Economics
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Recent studies find that women are less competitive than men. This gender difference in competitiveness has been suggested as a possible explanation for why men occupy the majority of top positions in many sectors. In this study we explore competitiveness in children. A related field experiment on Israeli children shows that only boys react to competition by running faster when competing in a race and that only girls react to the gender of their opponent. Here we test if these results carry over to 8-10 year old Swedish children. Sweden is typically ranked among the most gender equal countries in the world, thus culture could explain a potential difference in our results to those on Israeli children. We also introduce two more “female� sports: skipping rope and dancing, in order to study if reaction to competition is task dependent. Our results extend previous findings in two ways. First, we find no gender difference in reaction to competition in running. In our study, both boys and girls compete. We also find no gender differences in reaction to competition in skipping rope and dancing. Second, we find no clear effect on competitiveness of the opponent’s gender, neither on girls or boys, in any of the tasks. Our findings suggest that the existence of a gender gap in competitiveness among children may be partly cultural, and that the gap found in previous studies on adults may be caused by factors that emerge later in life. It remains to be explored whether these later factors are biological or cultural.

"Investigating Motives Behind Punishment and Sacrifice: A Within-Subject Analysis" Free Download

LUKE GARROD, University of East Anglia - ESRC Centre for Competition Policy and School of Economics
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We analyse an experiment that observes each subject’s behaviour for both roles in the ultimatum and dictator game, and two modified ultimatum games where in the event of a decline the proposer and responder receive a λ- and (1-λ)-share of their proposed payoffs, respectively, where in our games λ=1 (impunity game) and λ=0 (guarantor game). It is shown that inequality aversion or self-interest cannot describe the behaviour of over 60% of subjects across a number of roles given reasonable levels of error, because many subjects sacrifice material payoffs without a pecuniary punishment motive and some punish when the proposal is not unfavourable to them. The within-subject analysis suggests that many of the former may be motivated by a willingness to avoid ‘unfair’ bargains whereas a proportion of the latter may be motivated by spite.

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Behavioral & Experimental Economics

MORRIS ALTMAN
Professor and Head, Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

GERRIT ANTONIDES
Professor, Wageningen University and Research Center - Economics of Consumers and Households

OFER H. AZAR
Senior Lecturer, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - School of Management

COLIN CAMERER
Rea A. & Lela G. Axline Professor of Business Economics, California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

WERNER F.M. DEBONDT
Richard H. Driehaus Professor of Finance, DePaul University - Driehaus Center for Behavioral Finance

CATHERINE C. ECKEL
Professor, University of Texas at Dallas - Economics, Associate Professor of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University - Department of Economics

RICHARD G. FRANK
Margaret T. Morris Professor of Health Economics, Harvard Medical School, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

URI GNEEZY
Assistant Professor of Behavioral Science, University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

CLAIRE A. HILL
Professor, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities - School of Law

CATHLEEN A. JOHNSON
University of Arizona - Department of Economics, Director, Experimental Economics Group, Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

DANIEL KAHNEMAN
Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Professor of Public Affairs, Princeton University

BIJOU YANG LESTER
Professor of Economics, Drexel University - Department of Economics & International Business

JOHN A. LIST
Professor, University of Chicago - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN
Professor of Economics and Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University - Department of Social and Decision Sciences

ROBERT J. OXOBY
Associate Professor, University of Calgary - Economics, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

JOOST M. E. PENNINGS
Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, Professor, Wageningen University and Research Center - School of Social Sciences

MICHAEL J. ROSZKOWSKI
Director, Institutional Research, La Salle University

HUGH SCHWARTZ
Visiting Professor, University of the Republic, Montevideo, Uruguay

ANDREI SHLEIFER
Professor of Economics, Harvard University - Department of Economics, Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Fellow, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

PAUL SLOVIC
President, Decision Research, Professor, University of Oregon - Department of Psychology

GLENN E. SNELBECKER
Professor of Educational Psychology, Temple University - Psychological Studies in Education

CASS R. SUNSTEIN
Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard University - Harvard Law School

RICHARD H. THALER
Robert P. Gwinn Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics, University of Chicago - Booth School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

JOHN F. TOMER
Professor of Economics, Manhattan College - Department of Economics and Finance

PAUL J. ZAK
Director, Claremont Graduate University - Center for Neuroeconomics Studies

JASON ZWEIG
Personal Finance Columnist, The Wall Street Journal