BETHEL G. A. ERASTUS-OBILO, University of Atlanta
Email: ashleyx@comcast.net

The concept of a perverse verdict is one that pervades the Criminal justice system of nearly all common law jurisdictions. The English Criminal Justice system is no exception and the concept has become institutionalised as if it were a true occurrence.

This paper challenges the idea and argues that it is, technically, a legal non-event given the system of trial by jury. The theory is that besides the jury, no one else is invested with the power and authority to declare a verdict and this position is supported both by legal custom and the mechanism of the criminal justice system.

In this paper, I investigate the concept of the perverse verdict, the position of the superior courts and theorise on who may legitimately declare a verdict perverse. The paper concludes by alluding to transparency in the system by creating a requirement and an atmosphere of jury accountability in the form of an explained verdict as an antidote to the concept of the perverse verdict.

GILLES CUNIBERTI, University of Luxembourg
Email: gilles.cuniberti@free.fr

Arbitration is a creature of contract. It is a mode of dispute resolution which is only available to parties who have agreed to resort to it. Yet, it is widely perceived as the most suitable and the dominant method for the settlement of international commercial disputes. Why is it, then, that parties must opt in for a solution which appears as the most natural one in the community? The Article explores whether arbitration could become a default solution and thus lose its contractual foundation. The core of the Article discusses the numerous objections that such a proposition raises. Most importantly, I argue that the legitimacy of arbitrators would not be significantly lower than the legitimacy of courts, and that recent developments in specialized fields of international arbitration have shown that arbitrators can serve the public functions of courts. At the end of the Article, a model of non-consensual arbitration is proposed.

DAVID T. HARDY, affiliation not provided to SSRN
Email: dthardy@mindspring.com

The question of when a person may file a pre-prosecution civil challenge to a statute frequently arises in Federal courts. The issue arises in light of judicial power, which is limited to "cases or controversies," and does not encompass advisory decisions.

The Supreme Court has, over the last fifty years, steadily liberalized requirements for bringing a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute, to the point where standing to sue is established by the existence of an arguably unconstitutional law, and plaintiff's abstention from conduct in order to avoid violating it. This has the desirable functions of invalidating unconstitutional laws without requiring the challenging party to risk conviction,and reducing the risk that such a law, if unenforced, would chill legitimate conduct while remaining beyond review.

By and large, the Circuit courts have followed the Supreme Court's standards. However, in three Circuits, anomalous case law has developed that applies a much stricter standard, virtually requiring a personal, one-on-one, threat to prosecute. This stricter standard is, however, only applied in certain forms of challenges, whose common element appears to be that they are challenges the Circuits dislike on policy grounds.

Two of the Circuits appear to be trying to work around the anomalous case law, by distinguishing and narrowing it. But a complete change will require en banc review, with all its burdens.

JAMES ESTEN ABELL, University of Chicago - Law Review
Email: abellenator@gmail.com

This Comment addresses the question of whether claims brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act based on allegations of deception of a Standards Development Organization ("SDO") must meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Despite the growing amount of litigation in this area, to date, no court has specifically addressed this matter. The Comment explores how courts have approached similar questions in other areas involving intellectual property law and antitrust law, such as Walker Process fraud claims. Ultimately, the Comment suggests a framework for evaluating these new claims and concludes that within the framework, SDO-based antitrust claims do meet the requirements for heightened pleading.

CORTELYOU C. KENNEY, University of California, Berkeley School of Law
Email: cortelyou@berkeley.edu

Over the past two decades, the number of lawsuits filed against multinational corporate entities for environmental degradation and human rights abuses has skyrocketed. At the same time, U.S. courts have shown an increasing reluctance to hear such cases, turning to the common-law doctrine forum non conveniens (FNC) as a basis for dismissal. FNC dismissals usually mandate that corporate defendants submit to jurisdiction in the courts of the nation or nations where the alleged injuries occurred. While defendants often voluntarily agree to such stipulations, a disturbing practice has emerged in recent years: so-called boomerang litigation. Strengthened by procedural reforms, judiciaries abroad have proved both capable of entertaining complex environmental and human rights suits and willing to hold multinational businesses accountable. As a result, defendants have begun to mount challenges to the legitimacy of the very proceedings they assiduously lobbied for in the first place, challenges often brought in the same court that initially granted dismissal. These "boomerang suits" risk inconsistent results, create the possibility of substantial delay, and, depending on the claims at issue, threaten to magnify catastrophic harms to human rights and the environment. Using the infamous Aguinda v. Texaco and its progeny Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco as a case study, this Comment will propose a simple, though novel, solution: if a matter has been dismissed once on forum non conveniens grounds, subsequent courts must do everything in their power to ensure that foreign continuations go smoothly, including upending parallel litigation so that all claims stemming from the same "nucleus of operative fact" can be resolved in a single forum. This is particularly true when the stakes are not merely large sums of money, but the wellbeing of entire communities. To do otherwise sets the stage for manipulation and circumvention of judicial systems abroad. Further, even if businesses are ultimately held accountable, complications entailed by multiple international proceedings and appeals may, in the context of human rights and the environment, result in increased loss of life.