Table of Contents

On Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Game

Hassan Benchekroun, McGill University - Department of Economics
Amrita Ray Chaudhuri, Tilburg University - Center and Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Doing My Part to Save the Global Commons? Environmental Awareness and Voluntary Fuel Economization in Gasoline Markets

Patrick A. McLaughlin, Federal Railroad Administration
Bentley Coffey, Clemson University

Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Collective Action

Daniel H. Cole, Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis

Environmental Policy Stability and Innovation in Environmental Technologies

Nick Johnstone, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
Ivan HaÅ¡Ä?iÄ?, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Pascale Scapecchi, OECD

The Kyoto Protocol and International Technology Transfer: An Empirical Analysis Using Patent Data

Ivan HaÅ¡Ä?iÄ?, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Nick Johnstone, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

Regulating Climate: What Role for the Clean Air Act? A Primer: Background Paper for a Conference Co-Sponsored by Duke Law, Harvard Law School, and the Duke's Nicholas Institute

Brigham Daniels, University of Houston Law Center

Promoting the Integrity of the International Regime on Oil Pollution Compensation and Liability

James Harrison, University of Edinburgh - School of Law

A Review of Literatures on Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting in Some Selected Asian Countries

Mohammad Badrul Haider, Department of Accounting & Information Systems, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.


ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY ABSTRACTS

"On Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Game" Free Download
CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-23
TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2009-014

HASSAN BENCHEKROUN, McGill University - Department of Economics
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AMRITA RAY CHAUDHURI, Tilburg University - Center and Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
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We show that in a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, a cleaner technology (i.e., a decrease in the emission to output ratio) induces each country to increase its emissions and ultimately can yield a higher level of pollution and reduce social welfare.

"Doing My Part to Save the Global Commons? Environmental Awareness and Voluntary Fuel Economization in Gasoline Markets" Free Download

PATRICK A. MCLAUGHLIN, Federal Railroad Administration
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BENTLEY COFFEY, Clemson University
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Information about collectively-created problems, such as air pollution, may elicit voluntary changes to consumer behavior that at least partially offset the cause of the problem. We show that increases in information about climate change are associated with statistically and economically significant decreases in expenditure on gasoline, controlling for gasoline prices and income. We simultaneously provide updated estimates of the short run price and income elasticities of demand for gasoline in the US, utilizing recent weekly gasoline consumption and price data and spatially-delineated supply side disruptions due to hurricanes as an instrument for price.

"Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Collective Action" Free Download
Context and the Evolution of Mechanisms for Solving Collective Action Problems - Paper

DANIEL H. COLE, Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis
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This paper explores the significant role Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis (RCBA) plays in facilitating or impeding collective action. Domestically, well constructed RCBAs have facilitated collective action by muting political opposition. RCBAs can of course be manipulated to obstruct collective action or promote inefficient policies. However, the fact that RCBAs require transparency makes those efforts liable to discovery and disclosure, as in the case of the Bush Administration's failed "Clear Skies" initiative. The paper concludes with a discussion of the role RCBA is playing today in structuring international climate change negotiations, substantially determining the bargaining strategies of various parties in accordance with their differential expected costs and benefits.

"Environmental Policy Stability and Innovation in Environmental Technologies" Free Download

NICK JOHNSTONE, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
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IVAN HAŠČIČ, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
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PASCALE SCAPECCHI, OECD
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The effect of uncertainty related to environmental damages or technological change has on the optimal level of environmental policy stringency has been extensively analysed in the literature. However, empirical evidence on the innovation efforts of firms in the face of actual policy uncertainty has not been examined formally. Drawing upon real options theory, it is hypothesised that for any given level of environmental policy stringency, environmental policy uncertainty can serve as a brake on investment in innovative activities which can reduce the cost of meeting environmental objectives. By increasing the benefits of 'waiting', policy uncertainty will reduce incentives to identify innovative environmental technologies. Using patent counts as a measure of environmental innovation, preliminary empirical evidence has been presented which supports this hypothesis.

"The Kyoto Protocol and International Technology Transfer: An Empirical Analysis Using Patent Data" Free Download

IVAN HAŠČIČ, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
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NICK JOHNSTONE, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
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This paper examines the effect of the Kyoto Protocol on the international transfer of technologies relevant for climate change mitigation. The analysis is conducted using patent data on over 100 countries during a 20-year period 1985-2004. It is found that public policy plays a significant role in determining technology transfer. In particular, the degree of commitment and differences in the degree of commitment between pairs of Annex 1 countries has an effect on transfer. Transfers from Annex 1 countries to non-Annex 1 countries are significantly affected by involvement with the Clean Development Mechanism.

"Regulating Climate: What Role for the Clean Air Act? A Primer: Background Paper for a Conference Co-Sponsored by Duke Law, Harvard Law School, and the Duke's Nicholas Institute" Free Download

BRIGHAM DANIELS, University of Houston Law Center
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This short primer sets out a range of policy choices and legal options available to the EPA as it decides how it might use the Clean Air Act to address climate change. This paper was written as a background paper for a conference co-sponsored by Duke Law, Harvard Law School, and Duke's Nicholas Institute held on March 26, 2009.

"Promoting the Integrity of the International Regime on Oil Pollution Compensation and Liability" Free Download
U. of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No. 2009/08

JAMES HARRISON, University of Edinburgh - School of Law
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The international regime on oil pollution liability and compensation was intended to harmonise national laws on this subject in order to ensure adequate compensation for oil pollution victims. The success of the regime depends upon both its effective implementation into national law and a consistent and uniform interpretation by national courts. In practice, the uniform interpretation of the international regime has proven to be a challenge because of the different approaches taken by national courts towards the interpretation of the treaties. It is argued in this paper that the contracting parties to the treaties underlying the international regime already have a power to adopt authoritative interpretations. Whilst some decisions of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund may qualify as authoritative interpretations, it has been suggested that this power is perhaps better exercised through the International Maritime Organization, given its broader membership. Where an authoritative interpretation has been adopted, states and their courts are under an international obligation to follow that interpretation. However, there is currently no mechanism at the international level to monitor and promote compliance by national authorities. It is therefore argued that tentative discussions on monitoring the implementation of the international regime should be stepped up with a view to creating a formal compliance mechanism.

"A Review of Literatures on Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting in Some Selected Asian Countries" 

MOHAMMAD BADRUL HAIDER, Department of Accounting & Information Systems, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.
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The aim of this paper is to review the literatures on corporate social and environmental reporting (CSER) in the developing and newly industrialized countries. Focus is only on some selected Asian countries namely Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, India and Bangladesh. In reviewing literatures emphasis is given on the objectives of the papers, methodologies used, sample selection, key findings, and theoretical interpretation of the social and environmental disclosures. This paper serves as an important document for those who want to do research in this area especially with reference to the developing countries.

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Advisory Board

Environmental Law & Policy, Archives of 1997-2009

VICKI BEEN
Elihu Root Professor of Law and Director, Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, New York University School of Law

RALPH CAVANAGH
National Resource Defense Council

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON
Walter E. Meyer Professor of Property and Urban Law, Yale Law School

DANIEL A. FARBER
Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

RICHARD JAMES LAZARUS
Co-Director of the Supreme Court Institute and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center

PAUL PORTNEY
University of Arizona - Eller College of Management

JOSEPH L. SAX
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

ROBERT N. STAVINS
Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, University Fellow, Resources for the Future, Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

RICHARD B. STEWART
Emily Kempin Professor of Law, New York University School of Law

BARTON H. THOMPSON
Robert E. Paradise Prof. of Natural Resources Law, Stanford Law School