LEGAL HISTORY eJOURNAL

"The Principle of Legality in Islamic Criminal Justice System" Free Download

MUHAMMAD MUNIR, International Islamic University, Islamabad - Department of Law
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This work focuses on the principle of legality and the various other maxims regarding the rights of the accused under Islamic criminal justice system. Its main findings are: that the principle of legality (mabda’ al-Ibahat) is the most basic principle (mabadi’ usuli) of Islamic criminal law. This principle has two postulates: 1) no crime without law; and 2) no punishment without law. The natural outcome of these two principles is another principle, that is, ‘no retroactive application of criminal law’. The majority of authors consider the principle of legality as absolute, however, this work curves out certain exceptions to it. In case a crime endangers the peace and security of the state or the interest of the community is involved or when giving retrospective effect would be necessitated by the interest of the community rather than the individual or when the application of the principle is beneficial to the accused, then it is allowed to give criminal law retrospective effect. In addition, this work finds out that the principle of legality is not against Islamic law as is the opinion of some scholars. This principle is intended to safeguard the fundamental rights of the accused either by not charging him or giving him lesser punishment even if that punishment be promulgated subsequent to the commission of the crime. Books of classical Islamic law do not focus on the basic principles of Islamic law. Those that exist are either mentioned in each separate chapter devoted to a specific crime or they must be found by deduction. Adhering to the principle of legality means that Islamic criminal justice system was well advanced since the dawn of Islam.

"The Shifting Origins of International Law" Free Download
28 Leiden Journal of International Law 3 (2015), Forthcoming

IGNACIO DE LA RASILLA DEL MORAL, Brunel Law School
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Both state-centrism and Euro-centrism are under challenge in international law today and this double challenge, this work argues, is being fruitfully mirrored back into the study of the history of international law. It examines, in the first section, the effects of the rise of positivism as a method of norm-identification and the role of methodological nationalism over the study of the history of international law in the modern foundational period of international law. This is extended by an examination of how this bequeathed a double exclusionary bias regarding time and space to the study of the history of international law as well as a reiterative focus on a series of canonical events and authors to the exclusion of others such as those related to the Islamic history of international law. In the second section, the analysis turns to address why this state of historiographical affairs is changing, specifically highlighting intra-disciplinary developments within the field of the history of international law and the effects that the “international turn in the writing of history? is having on the writing of a new history of international law for a global age. The conclusion reflects on some of the tasks ahead by providing a series of historiographical signposts for the history of international law as a field of new research.

"A Government of Laws Not of Precedents 1776-1876: The Google Challenge to Common Law Myth" Free Download
4 British Journal of American Legal Studies 141 (2015)

JAMES R. MAXEINER, University of Baltimore - School of Law
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Conventional wisdom holds that the United States is a common law country of precedents where, until the 20th century (the “Age of Statutes?), statutes had little role. Digitization by Google and others of previously hard to find legal works of the 19th century challenges this common law myth. At the Centennial in 1876 Americans celebrated that “The great fact in the progress of American jurisprudence … is its tendency towards organic statute law and towards the systematizing of law; in other words, towards written constitutions and codification.? This article tests the claim of the Centennial Writers of 1876 and finds it credible.

"Responsibility to Protect, Responsibility to Whom?" Free Download

SIMON CHESTERMAN, National University of Singapore (NUS) - Faculty of Law
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In the natural sciences it is customary for theories and concepts to be tested and retested, falsifiability being one of the touchstones of academic rigour. In the social sciences, by contrast, it is common for ideas to simplify and ossify, with acceptance and repetition degrading them into clichés. So it is with a term like “sovereignty?, which is so loaded with significance that a precise and agreed definition in politics or law has long been dismissed as unlikely. In the absence of such a definition, its use in at least some fields of international relations has been reductionist — exemplified by the “billiard ball? model of states that are thought to interact with one another as billiard balls do on a table. Shiny and smooth, the surface of these billiard balls is all that matters to international society, ignorant of and irrelevant to what happens inside. Sovereignty in this conception is antithetical to the idea of responsibility to anyone but the sovereign. “L’état,? as Louis XIV may or may not have said, “c’est moi.?

Wielding not a cue but a hammer, Luke Glanville successfully demolishes this caricature in an impressive historical survey of sovereignty, building on a doctoral thesis supervised by Alex Bellamy and Richard Devetak. His argument, which extends back to the emergence of sovereignty in early modern Europe, is that sovereignty has always entailed aspects of responsibility as well as authority.

"Banking Sector in India – The Way Forward" Free Download

YOGESH PRASAD KOLEKAR, Ismailsaheb Mulla Law College, Satara
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The formal banking system started with establishment of General Bank of India 1786 followed by other banks which could not strive for long. The notable development in the history of the banking system in India took place with the establishment of the Bank of Bengal in 1806, Bank of Bombay in 1840 and the Bank of Madras in the year 1843. The Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance recommended creation of the Central Bank for control of currency as a result; the Reserve Bank of India established was in the year 1935. Post independence the Government enacted Banking Companies Act 1949 to regulate Banking business in India, which latter came to be known as the Banking Regulating Act 1949. The banking sector in the post Independence period was ruled by private Banking companies and the Government took the gallant decision to nationalize key private banks first through Ordinance and the latter through the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act 1969. The Government of India on the recommendation of the Narisimham Committee, introduced reforms in the banking sector and thus an era of liberation began in India.

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Northwestern University - School of Law, Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
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RONALD J. GILSON
Stanford Law School, Columbia Law School, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
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Advisory Board

Legal History eJournal

KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH
Princeton University - Department of Philosophy

PETER PRESTON BROOKS
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Scholar, Center for Human Values, Peter Brooks, Princeton University

JUDITH BUTLER
University of California, Berkeley

KIMBERLE CRENSHAW
Columbia Law School

HENRY LOUIS GATES
Harvard University - Department of African-American Studies

THOMAS C. GREY
Nelson Bowman Sweitzer & Marie B. Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School

DONNA HARAWAY
University of California, Santa Cruz - History of Consciousness

DUNCAN KENNEDY
Harvard Law School

MARGARET JANE RADIN
Henry King Ransom Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Distinguished Research Scholar, University of Toronto Faculty of Law

REVA B. SIEGEL
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law, Yale University - Law School

KENDALL THOMAS
Columbia Law School

IRIS MARION YOUNG
University of Chicago - Department of Political Science