Table of Contents

The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts

J. Atsu Amegashie, University of Guelph - Department of Economics, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Marco Runkel, University of Munich - Department of Economics, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Social Contracts, Civil Conflicts and International Peacemaking

S. Mansoob Murshed, Institute of Social Studies (ISS)

Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Processes and Outcomes of Buyer-Seller Negotiations through Instant Messaging: Hong Kong Chinese vs. Americans

Guang Yang, School of Management, Dalian University of Technology, Department of Marketing, School of Business, The George Washington University


CULTURE, NEGOTIATION, & INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT ABSTRACTS

"The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts" Free Download
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2261

J. ATSU AMEGASHIE, University of Guelph - Department of Economics, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
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MARCO RUNKEL, University of Munich - Department of Economics, CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
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We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. We show that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of conflicts. Surprisingly, in the open-loop equilibrium, the weaker faction exerts a higher effort when the stronger faction's military capability increases. This result is not possible in the absence of a desire for revenge. The closed-loop equilibrium is characterized by a self-deterrence effect: Anticipating the future retaliation of the opponent, a faction has an incentive to exert lower effort today. This strengthens the tendency to a stable steady state and paradoxically may decrease the factions' effort below the levels exerted in the case without revenge. We discuss some applications of our results and also offer an explanation of a puzzling empirical result obtained by Jaeger and Paserman (2007) in their study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics and their strategic value as commitment devices.

"Social Contracts, Civil Conflicts and International Peacemaking" 
MICROCON Policy Briefing No. 4

S. MANSOOB MURSHED, Institute of Social Studies (ISS)
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The regularity with which peace deals break down and civil wars resume is well established. This briefing looks at the factors that drive violent conflicts, and the factors that may undermine peace deals, including those brokered and supported by international third parties. For peace to last, agreements must be viable, credible and enforceable, and the commitment of donors must not be in doubt. For these conditions to be in place, conflict resolution must be in donors' interests.

"Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Processes and Outcomes of Buyer-Seller Negotiations through Instant Messaging: Hong Kong Chinese vs. Americans" Free Download

GUANG YANG, School of Management, Dalian University of Technology, Department of Marketing, School of Business, The George Washington University
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This paper examined culture's effect on the processes and outcomes of buyer-seller negotiations conducted through instant messaging (IM). The effects were examined by comparing Hong Kong (H.K.) Chinese intra-cultural negotiations with U.S. intra-cultural negotiations. The high-low context of culture (Hall 1976) and ingroup/outgroup bias of the cultures were found to influence negotiation behaviors and outcomes in the IM condition. The IM condition was considered a low context communication medium relative to face-to-face. Results show that negotiators from high context culture (H.K.), who may consider negotiating partners as outgroup members, used more distributive tactics, needed significantly longer time, and achieved lower Pareto efficiency and less joint satisfaction than negotiators from low context culture (U.S.) who do not distinguish strongly ingroup vs outgroup members. Negotiation tactics were found to mediate the effect of culture on Pareto efficiency. These results suggest that culture influences outcomes variables through processes variables for negotiations conducted through a low context medium.

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Solicitation of Abstracts

This journal posts working papers as well as papers accepted for publication that analyze cultural differences in conflict management and negotiation. The term conflict is broadly construed to include disputes that are interpersonal, intra-team, cross-group, organizational, inter-organizational, or international. The term culture refers to group-level differences in behavioral styles, norms, and values that often vary across nations and racial or ethnic groups. And the types of topics covered include (but are not limited to) negotiation, mediation, arbitration, justice, and social influence tactics. Any research method is acceptable, such as experiments, survey research, and ethnography. Theory papers are also appropriate.

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Directors

NEG SUBJECT MATTER EJOURNALS

MAX H. BAZERMAN
Harvard Business School - Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit
Email: mbazerman@hbs.edu

Please contact us at the above addresses with your comments, questions or suggestions for NEG-Sub.

Advisory Board

Culture, Negotiation, & International Conflict

JEANNE M. BRETT
DeWitt W. Buchanan, Jr., Professor of Dispute Resolution & Organizations, Director of the Dispute Re, Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

DEBORAH A. CAI
University of Maryland - Department of Communication

PETER J. CARNEVALE
Professor, University of Southern California - Department of Management and Organization

MARTIN N. DAVIDSON
University of Virginia - Darden Graduate School of Business Administration

CARSTEN K.W. DE DREU
Professor of Work and Organizational Psychology, University of Amsterdam - Department of Psychology

MICHELE JOY GELFAND
Assistant Professor, University of Maryland

BARBARA GRAY
Prof. of Management & Organization, Dir. Center for Research in Conflict and Negotiation, Pennsylvania State University - Center for Research in Conflict and Negotiation (CRCN)

ALAIN PEKAR LEMPEREUR
Associate Professor of Business Law

KWOK LEUNG
City University of Hong Kong - Department of Management

CHRISTOPHER MCCUSKER
Yale School of Management

MICHAEL MORRIS
Columbia Business School - Columbia University

DEAN TJOSVOLD
Lingnan University, Hong Kong

EVERT VAN DE VLIERT
University of Groningen - Faculty of Behavioral and Social Sciences