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TWO-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS ABSTRACTS"Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game"
HANNAH RILEY BOWLES, Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government We propose a two-level-game (Putnam, 1988) perspective on gender in job negotiations. At Level 1, candidates negotiate with the employers. At Level 2, candidates negotiate with domestic partners. In order to illuminate the interplay between these two levels, we review literature from two separate bodies of literature. Research in psychology and organizational behavior on candidate-employer negotiations sheds light on the effects of gender on Level 1 negotiations. Research from economics and sociology on intra-household bargaining elucidates how negotiations over the allocation of domestic labor at Level 2 influence labor force participation at Level 1. In conclusion, we integrate practical implications from these two bodies of literature to propose a set of prescriptive suggestions for candidates to approach job negotiations as a two-level game and to minimize disadvantageous effects of gender on job negotiation outcomes. "Dynamics of Two-Actor Cooperation-Competition Conflict Models"
LARRY S. LIEBOVITCH, Florida Atlantic University A mathematical model for conflict can give us insight into which mechanisms are the most important in maintaining or resolving a conflict. We developed a nonlinear model of the interactions in time between two groups based on the intuitive and experimental insights of Deustch (1973, 2006) and Pruitt (1969, 2006) and the dynamical insights of Gottman, Murray, Swanson, Tyson, and Swanson (2002) and Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, and Bui-Wrzosinska (2006). In this model, the state of each group at a given moment in time depends on its own state in isolation, its previous state in time, its inertia to change, and the influence from the other group. Each group can influence the other group either through cooperation, that is positive feedback, or through competition, that is negative feedback. We analyzed this model using analytical methods and numerical computer simulations. We show how the positive or negative feedback between the groups leads to different dynamics and steady states. When the strength of the feedback is less than the inertia to change, then positive or negative feedback between both groups leads both groups into a neutral state. Above this threshold their behavior changes. Positive feedback between both groups leads to either both groups being in a positive state or both groups being in a negative state. Negative feedback between both groups leads to both groups being neutral or in opposite positive and negative states. Whether they are both neutral or in opposite states depends sensitively on their initial states and their uninfluenced states which tips their behavior from being neutral into entirely new states. Mixed negative and positive feedback between the groups results in oscillations between positive and negative states with both groups stabilizing in a neutral state. These results give us insight into how the dynamics of group behavior depends on the cooperation or competition between the groups. "Trial and Settlement Negotiations between Asymmetrically Skilled Parties"
ERIC LANGLAIS, University of Nancy II
Parties engaged in a litigation generally enter the discovery process with different informations regarding their case and/or an unequal endowment in terms of skill and ability to produce evidence and predict the outcome of a trial. Hence, they have to bear different legal costs to assess the (equilibrium) plaintiff's win rate. The paper analyses pretrial negotiations and revisits the selection hypothesis in the case where these legal expenditures are private information. This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence (Osborne, 1999). Two alternative situations are investigated, depending on whether there exists a unilateral or a bilateral informational asymmetry.
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Solicitation of Abstracts
This Journal publishes abstracts of working papers as well as papers accepted for publication in various areas of conflict resolution and negotiation between two disputing parties or entities, including disputes between individuals, two identifiable groups, or organizations. Papers can include analytic modeling, field and laboratory research, conceptual papers, and/or case studies. All substantive topic areas of the two party negotiation domain are welcome, including the role of identity, emotion, trust, regret and loss aversion, and other factors impacting two party negotiations.
Distribution ServicesIf your Institution is interested in learning more about increasing readership for its research by becoming a Partner in Publishing or starting a Research Paper Series, please email: Management@SSRN.com. Distributed by:DirectorsNEG SUBJECT MATTER EJOURNALS MAX H. BAZERMAN Please contact us at the above addresses with your comments, questions or suggestions for NEG-Sub.
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