HANNAH RILEY BOWLES, Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
Email: hannah_bowles@harvard.edu
KATHLEEN MCGINN, Harvard Business School - Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit
Email: kmcginn@hbs.edu

We propose a two-level-game (Putnam, 1988) perspective on gender in job negotiations. At Level 1, candidates negotiate with the employers. At Level 2, candidates negotiate with domestic partners. In order to illuminate the interplay between these two levels, we review literature from two separate bodies of literature. Research in psychology and organizational behavior on candidate-employer negotiations sheds light on the effects of gender on Level 1 negotiations. Research from economics and sociology on intra-household bargaining elucidates how negotiations over the allocation of domestic labor at Level 2 influence labor force participation at Level 1. In conclusion, we integrate practical implications from these two bodies of literature to propose a set of prescriptive suggestions for candidates to approach job negotiations as a two-level game and to minimize disadvantageous effects of gender on job negotiation outcomes.

SUSAN A. MCCRACKEN, McMaster University - Michael G. DeGroote School of Business
Email: smccrac@mcmaster.ca
STEVEN E. SALTERIO, Queen's University - School of Business
Email: ssalterio@business.queensu.ca
REGAN N. SCHMIDT, Queen's University - School of Business
Email: rschmidt@business.queensu.ca

Most serious auditor client management (ACM) negotiations occur between audit partners and senior client management. Research also shows that audit managers often attempt to resolve issues with client management for several reasons, including efficiency. Prior negotiation research in other settings as well as accounting suggests that if partners employ different strategies than managers, different negotiation outcomes will occur. Thus, given the importance of ACM negotiation to the resulting financial statements, an understanding of the intended strategy usage of partners versus managers is important. Further, generic negotiation research provides conflicting predictions about which integrative strategies would be planned to be used when experience level versus power/status differs, the exact situation of partners and managers. We find that in the use of one strategy, working together on solving the issue cooperatively, partners and managers intend to approach negotiations the same way; but that for another strategy, bringing other potential issues into consideration, their intended strategy use differs. Focusing on intended distributive (win-lose) strategies usage, we find that while power/status and experience negotiation research predictions suggest both partners and managers should use the strategies in the same manner, our results show accounting context specific use. We find that partners and managers intended distributive strategies use interacted with important elements of the accounting context which could not be predicted beyond the general likelihood of their existence if experience and power/status matters interacts with context. Implications for both practice and research are discussed.

LUIGI RUSSI, Bocconi University
Email: luigi.russi.business@gmail.com

The present paper recounts the various steps which parties to a transnational contract containing a renegotiation clause may need to go through, should the circumstances accounted for in the renegotiation clause come to existence. To this end, the article sets off from an outline of the most relevant structural features and functions of renegotiation clauses, and of the typical obligations which may derive therefrom.

Secondly, the paper's focus narrows down to the - by no means infrequent - case of failure to renegotiate in presence of an arbitration clause governing the parties' agreement. In the latter case, in particular, several possible solutions facing the arbitral tribunal are explored, even by making parallel reference to the powers of national judges in similar cases. Such discussion also tackles the problem of the possible recognition of an award containing an adaptation of the contract by the arbitral tribunal, pursuant to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Finally, possible criteria which the arbitral tribunal may resort to in the latter case are also explored. We conclude that it is not possible to give a clear-cut answer to the question of whether, given the insertion of a renegotiation clause in a long-term transnational contract, arbitration may then successfully make up for the parties' lack of agreement. To this end, it is in fact required that the parties' will, the applicable procedural law and the applicable substantive law all converge on enabling contract adaptation by arbitrators.

VIRGINIA DOELLGAST, University of London, King's College London, Department of Management
Email: virginia.doellgast@kcl.ac.uk

This article assesses the relationship between national and collective bargaining institutions, management practices, and employee turnover, based on case study and survey evidence from U.S. and German call center workplaces. German call centers were more likely to adopt high-involvement management practices than those in the United States, even across workplaces with no collective bargaining institutions. Within Germany, union and works council presence was positively associated with high-involvement practices, while works council presence alone had no effect. In contrast, union presence in U.S. call centers showed either a negative association or no association with these practices. National and collective bargaining institutions and high-involvement management practices were associated with lower quit rates in both countries, with only partial mediation.