HANS VEDDER, University of Groningen
Email: h.h.b.vedder@rug.nl

The EC and it's Member States struggle to draw the line between markets and public interests. Traditionally, these two are contrasted, most prominently by the continental Member States and followed by a conclusion that public interests require public governance. Some of this public governance takes the form of a public law framework within which self-regulation by the members of a profession occurs. We also see a more subtle version of self-regulation, whereby regulators are so dependent on specific information from the professions concerned, that they effectively become captive regulators. In those circumstances, the degree to which the public interest, rather than the interest of the professions concerned, is actually served may be doubted.

This holds true even more where legislators, both at the EC and the Member State level, are moving the line between markets and public interests towards the market side. It is uniformly recognised that public governance is not the blanket solution for market failures and the introduction of market mechanisms may actually increase consumer welfare. The contrast between public interests and markets may therefore also be rephrased into a citizens versus consumers antithesis. EC (competition) law plays a prominent role in this debate in that it requires member state regulators to rethink how and to what extent their actions serve the public interest. This role of EC (competition) law requires a fundamental rethinking of the market (consumer) and public interest (citizen) antithesis. The hypothesis central to this paper is that EC (competition) law can serve as a democratic instrument to increase legitimacy whilst refining the line between markets and public interests.

JOËLLE DE SÉPIBUS, University of Fribourg
Email: joelle.desepibus@unifr.ch

The so-called 'Linking'-Directive adopted in 2004 does not impose any limit on the import of JI and CDM credits under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), but requires from the Member States to set, in accordance with their 'supplementarity' obligations under the Marrakesh Accords, the maximal amount of Kyoto 'units' each covered installation is entitled to use for compliance under the scheme. Fearing a second price collapse of the European Union Allowance, the Commission decided, however, in 2006 to impose strict limits on the use of JI and CDM credits during the second trading period. This paper examines the legal basis of the Commission's decision and explores further the international and European legal framework within which the current debate on the use of JI and CDM credits and post-2012 international offsets takes place. It analyses in particular the recent proposal of the Commission on the third trading period of the EU ETS and the related report of rapporteur Doyle of the European Parliament and discusses the necessity to introduce quantitative and qualitative restrictions on the use of international offsets within the EU ETS against the backdrop of the international negotiations on a new global deal on climate change.

XANDRA KRAMER, Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)
Email: kramerefrg@eur.nl

The Rome I regulation on law applicable to contractual obligation replaces the Rome convention that contains new conflict of law rules for insurance contract. This rule replaces the conflict rule included in the various insurance directives. In fact, the existing system of insurance contracts is more complex relating to the place of the risk or the territory, choice of law and enforceability of the law of the European community. The Rome convention has addressed many of the above issues and also contains a provision relating to consumer contracts. The new Rome Regulations are effective from December, 2009. The author makes an analysis, discusses and evaluates new conflict rules on insurance contracts with special reference to Article 7 of Rome I regulation. The author opines that Article 7 of the Rome I regulation is more disappointing.

ERIC ENGLE, Universität Bremen, Harvard University - Harvard Law School
Email: eric.engle@yahoo.com

This article outlines the general principles of European environmental law so that common law jurists can understand their potentials and limits as a means to protect the environment. Though general principles of law are important as a source or at least as a persuasive guide to law in civilian systems, these principles of law do not exist in the domestic law of common law states such as the U.S. except vestigially in the general principles used in equity proceedings (equitable maxims).

MARIJN VAN DAELEN, Tilburg University - Faculty of Law
Email: m.m.a.vandaelen@uvt.nl

Risk management provisions can be divided into provisions that require companies to have risk management systems in place, provisions that require the disclosure of information on such systems, and provisions that require the disclosure of information on actual risks. Disclosure requirements have necessitated including information on corporate risks in such documents as the annual report, quarterly reports, and the prospectus. The prospectus plays a pivotal role in attracting capital from public investors. This paper focuses on information disclosure requirements on risk management in the prospectus. In more detail, this paper discusses which information companies should disclose to comply with these requirements. A generally neglected issue is that prospectus liability could be triggered by giving either too little information or too much information. Information overload and boilerplate text can obscure the main risks. Both might be qualified as misleading information. Analysing prospectuses, this paper shows that it could be debated whether the actual reporting complies with Directive 2003/71/EC and Commission Regulation 809/2004 regarding information on risks disclosed in prospectuses. A safe harbour could, however, be reached by adequately balancing the information disclosure on risks. To determine the minimum information on risks that should be disclosed in prospectuses, the four-step method presented in this paper could be used. These steps are: (1) identifying risks with a material adverse effect on a company and its securities; (2) classifying risks based on their probability and impact; (3) allocating risk responses; (4) and selecting the minimum information that should be disclosed. By using this method, companies can provide sufficient and objective investor information. Finally, this paper concludes with the improvements to be gained applying the four-step method instead of the actual ad hoc method.