ENTREPRENEURSHIP & LAW eJOURNAL
Sponsored by the Kauffman Foundation
"The Diffusion of Patented Oil and Gas Technology with Environmental Uses: A Forward Patent Citation Analysis"
IEB Working Paper N. 2014/31
M. T. COSTA-CAMPI, University of Barcelona
NÉSTOR DUCH-BROWN, European Union - Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), University of Barcelona
Relevant advances in the mitigation of environmental impact could be obtained by the appropriate diffusion of existing environmental technologies. In this paper, we look at the diffusion of knowledge related to environmental technologies developed within the oil and gas industry. To assess knowledge spillovers from oil and gas inventions as a measure of technology diffusion, we rely on forward patent citations methodology. Results show that there is a strong likelihood that the citing patent will be eventually linked to environmental technologies if the original oil and gas invention has already environmental uses. Moreover, both intra and intersectoral spillovers produce a "turnabout" effect, meaning that citing patents show the opposite quality level of the cited patent. Our results support the idea that more sector-specific environmental policies, with an emphasis on diffusion, would significantly improve the use of environmental technologies developed within the oil and gas industry.
"A Critical Review of Recent Substantive and Procedural Developments in EU Cartels"
ANCA DANIELA CHIRITA, Durham University - Department of Law
The aim of this article is to explore the most recent appeals concerning illegal cartels under Article 101 TFEU, i.e., anti-competitive agreements in restraint of trade, by revealing the relevant principles underpinning both the substantive and the procedural review of cartels, namely, the industrial organization criteria and the legal use of evidentiary presumptions respectively. Arguments advancing a perceived ‘criminalisation’ of the EU fines on cartels coupled with the success rate of appeals on the basis of an erroneous calculation of the level of fines, as well as the overall length of cartel proceedings, raise other pertinent issues regarding the need for institutional reform, in particular, a specialised EU Competition Tribunal. The present contribution is backwards limited to appeals from 2014 to 2013. It seeks to highlight several hurdles in appeals as reflected by the interpretation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular, the right to good administration of justice before an independent and impartial tribunal, the right to a fair presentation of evidence through the sending of a Statement of Objections (SO), the right to have access to the file, the right to a reasoned decision and within a reasonable time, and the proportionality of the administrative fine. Therefore, such rights of defence as are enjoyed by corporations and mirrored by the human rights catalogue enshrined in the EU Charter make them even more contestable before the EU Courts.
"Why Do Not All Firms Engage in Tax Avoidance?"
FAccT Center Working Paper Nr. 19/2014
MARTIN JACOB, WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
ANNA ROHLFING-BASTIAN, University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
KAI SANDNER, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Empirical evidence suggests substantial cross-firm variation in the extent of tax avoidance. However, this variation is not well understood. This paper provides a theoretical background for testing cross-firm differences in tax avoidance. We develop a formal model to analyze the incentives for firms to engage in tax avoidance. The tax avoidance decision is a function of moral hazard, tax planning costs, and the pre-tax profit margin. The tax planning costs differ according to firm ownership and control structures, but their effect depends on the firm pre-tax profit margin. If profit margins are low, moral hazard problems drive the tax avoidance decision. In contrast, in case of high profit margins, the tax avoidance decision is mainly driven by tax planning costs. One implication of our model is that moral hazard can (partly) explain why some firms do not engage in tax avoidance. If moral hazard problems are severe, tax avoidance is less likely. Our model can be applied to test differences in tax avoidance activity between public and private firms, between firms that differ in managerial ownership, and between family and non-family firms.
"Defining and Profiling Phoenix Activity"
HELEN L. ANDERSON, Melbourne Law School
ANN O'CONNELL, University of Melbourne - Law School
IAN RAMSAY, University of Melbourne - Law School, Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR)
MICHELLE ANNE WELSH, Monash University - Faculty of Business and Economics
HANNAH WITHERS, Melbourne Law School
Phoenix activity occurs where the business of a failed company is transferred to a second (typically newly incorporated) company and the second company’s controllers are the same as the first company’s controllers. Phoenix activity can be legal as well as illegal. Phoenix activity has become a significant concern for governments because of the number of individuals promoting illegal phoenix activity, the significant loss of tax revenue it causes, and the recognition of the potentially devastating impact it has on creditors and employees.
A key problem faced by regulators is the difficulty associated with identifying whether particular phoenix activity is illegal or not. This report (which forms part of a larger research project) profiles the characteristics of both legal and illegal phoenix activity to assist regulators in formulating education, detection, and enforcement strategies. The report examines the various historical attempts to define phoenix activity and then identifies the following five categories of phoenix activity and provides examples of each: (1) the legal phoenix or business rescue; (2) the problematic phoenix; (3) illegal type 1 phoenix: intention to avoid debts formed as company starts to fail; (4) illegal type 2 phoenix: phoenix as a business model; and (5) complex illegal phoenix activity.
The report also examines the role of professional advisors in facilitating illegal phoenix activity, the victims of illegal phoenix activity (including governments, unsecured trade creditors and employees) and two industries (the building and construction industry and the financial services industry) where illegal phoenix activity has been identified as a particular concern.
About this eJournal
Sponsored by the Kauffman Foundation
This eJournal distributes working paper and accepted paper abstracts in subject matters that concern how the law, broadly conceived, impacts entrepreneurship, small business, growth companies, entrepreneurship within large companies, and innovation policy generally.
The eJournal welcomes research not only on topics of regulation and public policy, but also the law of contracts, contract design, and informal relationships and networks that affect entrepreneurs and may substitute for legal contracts. Topic areas include contract design, judicial interpretation and enforcement of contracts, corporate law, partnership law and choice of entity, family businesses, franchising and joint ventures, intellectual property and licensing, small business regulation, securities law, bankruptcy, and social responsibility and sustainability. The Journal welcomes submissions from scholars in finance, economics, sociology, and other disciplines as well as legal scholars.
Editor: Victor Fleischer, University of San Diego
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