JEDRZEJ G. FRYNAS, affiliation not provided to SSRN
Email: g.frynas@mdx.ac.uk

This article critically evaluates recent claims about the positive role that corporate social responsibility (CSR) could play in contributing to international development goals such as poverty alleviation and health improvements.

The article suggests that many recent claims about the positive contribution of CSR to international development are unjustified based on four arguments: (1) lack of empirical evidence; (2) analytical limitations of CSR; (3) the constraints of the business case for CSR; and (4) unresolved governance questions.

On the one hand, the article implies that private firms are unlikely to act as successful development actors without corporate governance reforms, which would align the interests of non-traditional stakeholders with corporate interests. On the other hand, the article implies that international development priorities may misalign the intrinsic interests of shareholders and company executives.

The current CSR agenda seems inappropriate for addressing international development goals.

KRISTA BONDY, University of Nottingham - Nottingham University Business School (NUBS)
DIRK MATTEN, University of London - Royal Holloway College
Email: Dirk.Matten@nottingham.ac.uk
JEREMY MOON, Nottingham University Business School (NUBS)
Email: Jeremy.Moon@nottingham.ac.uk

Stakeholders must be careful in assuming that the presence of a code indicates CSR commitments or behavior. Stakeholders need to look at the content of the code to confirm or deny this assumption, particularly such stakeholders as investors who tend to use the existence of a code as evidence of CSR practices to tick check the box.Findings are addressed to theoretical debates about the construction of corporate identity, the amoralization of business, and the globalization of management practices.A web-based study of 150 corporations from three different countries indicates there is little empirical support for this link between codes and CSR. Thus, if a corporation has a code, it is more likely used to govern traditional business concerns, such as compliance with third party governance requirements, internal issues such as conflict of interest, bribery and corruption, insider trading, etc. This is consistent across all three countries. Therefore we must be cautious against assuming a link between codes and CSR. Evidence of the different governance contexts is also briefly discussed.We investigate the assumption found in code and corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature that suggests codes are primarily associated with the CSR practices of an organization.EmpiricalWe investigate the assumption found in code and corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature that suggests codes are primarily associated with the CSR practices of an organization.A web-based study of 150 corporations from three different countries indicates there is little empirical support for this link between codes and CSR. Thus, if a corporation has a code, it is more likely used to govern traditional business concerns, such as compliance with third party governance requirements, internal issues such as conflict of interest, bribery and corruption, insider trading, etc. This is consistent across all three countries. Therefore we must be cautious against assuming a link between codes and CSR. Evidence of the different governance contexts is also briefly discussed.Findings are addressed to theoretical debates about the construction of corporate identity, the amoralization of business, and the globalization of management practices.Stakeholders must be careful in assuming that the presence of a code indicates CSR commitments or behavior. Stakeholders need to look at the content of the code to confirm or deny this assumption, particularly such stakeholders as investors who tend to use the existence of a code as evidence of CSR practices to tick check the box.

BARRY M. MITNICK, University of Pittsburgh
Email: mitnick@pitt.edu

This paper argues that the central function of the board of directors is, and has always been, to provide assurance, and reassurance. The paper introduces a typology of four classes of board functions, legal, normative, descriptive, and utilitarian, and argues that none adequately captures the key function of the board, assurance. Not only is assurance at the heart of modern corporate governance; it has always been there, and, indeed, must be there because of a basic problem in organizational design, what I call the Governance Paradox (GP). One method of managing the Governance Paradox is to create pantheonic directorates. In order to understand the fundamental nature of my claim that what the board is all about is assurance, I then review the functioning of the very first joint-stock company of modern form, the Russia or Muscovy Company of Tudor England. I conclude by briefly arguing the utility of reconceptualizing the assurance problems of corporate governance in terms of an agent capitalism model of the firm.

SEAN LYONS, Risk-Intelligence-Security-Control (R.I.S.C.) International (Ireland)
Email: sean.lyons@riscinternational.ie

Corporate defence represents an organisation's program for self defence or self protection. This paper explains the concept in more detail and explores where business continuity fits into the corporate defence paradigm. The changing nature of corporate defence in the 21st century is discussed and the resulting opportunities which present themselves for those involved in business continuity initiatives are identified. The paper is designed to provoke a certain degree of thinking outside the box and encourage future progress in this area.